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RESISTANCES TO REFORMING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: THE DIFFUSION OF QLCCS
Robert Eli Rosen*
INTRODUCTION

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission")
"encourages" company boards to form committees with responsibility to
receive reports from attorneys regarding possible legal noncompliance "as a
means of effective corporate governance."' The SEC accords benefits to
companies that establish such committees, provided that the committee
meets certain qualifications. A Qualified Legal Compliance Committee
("QLCC") is composed of independent directors, one of whom must be a
member of the audit committee. It receives and investigates reports from
attorneys working for the company who have credible evidence of material
violations of laws, regulations, or breaches of fiduciary duties. The QLCC
makes recommendations to the entire board, the chief executive officer
("CEO"), and the general counsel or chief legal officer ("CLO"). 2 A QLCC
institutionalizes at the board level the company's responsibility to obey law.
The SEC estimated that approximately 20% of "issuers" 3 would adopt
QLCCs, although it admitted that "[t]he Commission does not know how
* Professor of Law, University of Miami. I would like to thank Terence Anderson, William
A. Birdthistle, Charlie Cullinan, Jason Folk, Patrick Gudridge, Susan Hackett, Stephen
Halpert, Lili Levi, Geoff Loftus, Christine Parker, Broc Romanek, George S. Schuhmann,
and William Widen. I also thank the lawyers who shared their time to discuss Qualified
Legal Compliance Committees ("QLCCs"). Many of these lawyers are quoted herein. Their
anonymity is protected by identifying them only by whether they were inside or outside
counsel at the time of the interview.
1. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Part II,
Securities Act Release No. 8185, Exchange Act Release No. 47,276, Investment Company
Act Release No. 25,919, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6305 (Feb. 6, 2003) (final rule); see also Paul S.
Maco et al., The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: A Practical Choice?, Secs.
Regulatory
Update,
June
9,
2003,
at
1,
available
at
http://www.velaw.com/pdf/resources/sru060903.pdf (stating that the QLCC is an "effort by
the Commission in engineering corporate governance").
2. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k) (2005). A QLCC is "established by the issuer's board of
directors." Id. § 205.2(k)(3).
3. Id. § 205.2(h). An "issuer" is defined as follows:
[A]n issuer (as defined in section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. § 78c) [2000], the securities of which are registered under section 12 of that
Act (15 U.S.C. § 781) [2000], or that is required to file reports under section 15(d)
of that Act (15 U.S.C. § 780(d) [2000]), or that files or has filed a registration
statement that has not yet become effective under the Securities Act of 1933 (15
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widespread adoption of the QLCC alternative will be." 4 The Commission
5
estimated that, of the approximately 18,200 issuers subject to the rule,
6
3640 issuers would form QLCCs.
Between October 2002 and September 30, 2005, however, only 456
entities formed QLCCs. 7 Thus, 97.5% of issuers have not yet adopted this
means of corporate governance, and over 87% of those the SEC estimated
would adopt the QLCC have not yet done so. Over 96% of the companies
listed on the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") have not established
QLCCs. 8 At the moment, not only are the numbers small, but only about
one-half as many companies established QLCCs in the year ending
September 30, 2005, 9as in the previous year. For issuers who are
"operating companies," -that is, issuers who are not registered companies
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("1940 Act")l°-the number of
companies adopting QLCCs this year (forty-two) is about one-quarter of
those in the year ending September 30, 2004. On the other hand,
"investment companies," issuers that are registrants under the 1940 Act
(i.e., mutual funds and investment trusts)'1 established QLCCs in
comparable numbers in 2004 (108) and 2005 (106). Based on last year's
numbers, investment companies will be an increasing proportion of the
small number of companies that establish QLCCs. Why?
I approach board adoption of QLCCs as a question of diffusion. 12 Why
has this innovation not become contagious among operating companies?
Why has it become much more contagious among investment companies?
U.S.C. §§ 77a et. seq.), and that is not withdrawn, but does not include a foreign
government issuer.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
4. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Part III, 68 Fed.
Reg. 6296, 6305 (Feb. 6, 2003) (final rule).
5. Id. at 6316.
6. Id.; see also id. at 6316 n.132 (explaining the basis for the estimate).
7. The data is described in greater detail infra in Part I.A. The data collection methods
used are described infra in note 36.
8. I compared the list of companies that have formed QLCCs in the appendix, with the
NYSE Listed Company Directory, http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/listed.htm (last visited
Nov. 3, 2005). One hundred and five New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") listed
companies have formed QLCCs, and the NYSE "lists close to 2,800 companies." New York
Stock Exchange, http://www.nyse.com/aboutlisted/1089312755443.htm (last visited Nov.
5, 2005). One hundred and five is 3.75% of 2800.
9. An "operating company" is "a typical company . . . outside the investment
management business whose primary purpose is the provision of goods or services and not
simply the investment of assets." William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis
of Rents and Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 Tul. L. Rev. (forthcoming Dec.

2005).
10. See Rules and Regulations for Investment Company Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. §§
270.0-1 to .60a-1 (2005).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c) (2000) sets forth the definition of "investment company" under
the Investment Company Act of 1940.
12. There is extensive literature on the diffusion of innovations. For a partial review of
the literature and a discussion of the applicability of diffusion of innovations to socio-legal
studies, see William Twining, Social Science and Diffusion of Law, 32 J.L. & Soc'y 203

(2005).
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In addressing these questions, I assume that innovations are spread by
communications from change agents, and I examine the arguments these
agents have advanced for and against QLCCs. 13 In this Article, I focus on
corporate lawyers as the relevant change agents, because, in deciding
whether or not to form QLCCs, company boards "are likely to rely heavily
14
on . . . their attorneys' advice."'
In adopting a diffusion perspective, I reject the notion that the
nonappearance of QLCCs is simply a matter of inertia. I take seriously the
resistance of those who could have tried to spread the innovation: 15 the
corporate bar. It may be true, as one lawyer said in an interview, that
"upper level management and boards of directors aren't even aware of the
fact that the QLCC option exists" and that this ignorance may result, as the
lawyer emphasized, from the fact that "CLOs aren't apprising boards and
management of the existence of the option."' 16 And, as the lawyer admitted
without emphasizing, the ignorance may also stem from the fact that neither
he nor any member of his firm apprises boards or management of the
existence of the QLCC option. The adoption of this reform to corporate
governance has been actively resisted by both inside and outside counsel.

13. This Article examines rhetoric, not companies. It does not report on the small
minority of companies that have formed QLCCs. Nor does it report on the companies that
have reached decisions not to adopt QLCCs. Unlike decisions to form QLCCs, decisions not
to do so generally are not reported. But see Goldman Passes on Committee Approach for
Conduct Rules, Compliance Rep., Aug. 25, 2003, at 4 (discussing Goldman Sachs Asset
Management's decision not to form a QLCC). Instead, using available data, published
reports, and interviews with a non-random and small group of lawyers, this Article outlines
reasons that have been presented for non-adoption. As my colleague Stephen Halpert
suggested to me, I am concerned with what the non-adoption of QLCCs signals.
14. Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee:
Using the Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors, 53 Duke L.J. 517,
546 (2003); see also Am. Bar Ass'n, Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on
Corporate
Responsibility
21
(2003),
available
at
http://www.abanet.orgfbuslaw/corporateresponsibility/final-report.pdf
[hereinafter Cheek
Report] ("[A] prudent corporate governance program should call upon lawyers-notably the
corporation's general counsel-to assist in the design and maintenance of the corporation's
procedures for promoting legal compliance.").
15. See D. Eleanor Westney, Institutionalization Theory and the Multinational
Corporation, in Organization Theory and the Multinational Corporation 53, 59 (Sumantra
Ghoshal & D. Eleanor Westney eds., 1993) (discussing how institutionalization theory
"emphasizes the reinforcing role played by the environment," rather than the role played by
"inertia" in explaining the "persistence of organizational patterns").
16. Compare this statement by a lawyer with one describing how Chief Legal Officers
("CLOs") apprised boards of changes in audit committee requirements. See The Role of
Attorneys in Corporate Governance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets,
Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs.,
108th Cong. 18 (2004) (statement of Linda Madrid on behalf of the Ass'n of Corp. Counsel),
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/108-66.pdf
(describing the
response by "many, many law departments across the country ... soon after the enactment
of Sarbanes-Oxley" to prepare "written requirements" and deliver "training" to the board
regarding changes in the audit committee's responsibilities).
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Contrary to expectations,' 7 I find that corporate lawyers either oppose the
formation of QLCCs or offer only tepid and cautionary support for them. I
examine how their arguments predict the behaviors of executives and
directors. I pay attention to the assumptions about social relations
contained in the justifications for their resistance.
I treat the decision by issuer boards to adopt or not to adopt QLCCs as a
"self-consciously interpretive process. ' 18 Understanding this cultural
construction of meaning helps to explain the fate of QLCCs. As David
Strang and Sarah Soule have noted, "Practices that accord with cultural
understandings of appropriate and effective action tend to diffuse more
quickly than those that do not." 19 I seek to discover why QLCCs are
understood as being neither appropriate nor effective for operating
companies, and to speculate about why investment advisers20 might
promote QLCCs to the investment companies they administer. 2 1
Innovations cannot be studied individually; rather, "innovations compete
and support each other."'22 To understand the diffusion of QLCCs, the
corporation before and after the innovation's implementation (or nonimplementation) must be examined. 23 For example, arguing against
QLCCs on the ground that they will cause excessive reporting and thereby
waste directorial resources 24 ignores that audit committees are creating
17. See, e.g., Fisch & Gentile, supra note 14, at 546-51 (arguing that both inside and
outside counsel will urge boards to form QLCCs); see also Jeffrey I. Snyder, Note,
Regulation of Lawyer Conduct Under Sarbanes-Oxley: Minimizing Law-Firm Liability by
EncouragingAdoption of Qualified Legal Compliance Committees, 24 Rev. Litig. 223, 245
(2005). Snyder writes as follows:
In addition to avoiding potential liability, attorneys will soon come to prefer
QLCC-equipped clients because there is no need or even pressure to embarrass a
client, no risk of alienating other clients, and no pressure to evaluate the response
received from the up the ladder process to determine if it is an "appropriate
response."
Id. (footnote omitted).
18. David Strang & Sarah A. Soule, Diffusion in Organizations and Social Movements:
From Hybrid Corn to Poison Pills, 24 Ann. Rev. Soc. 265, 276-77 (1998) (describing this
approach to diffusion research); see also infra Part I.B.3 (discussing "normative
isomorphism").
19. Strang & Soule, supra note 18, at 278; see also Gerald F. Davis & Heinrich R.
Greve, Corporate Elite Networks and Governance Change in the 1980s, 103 Am. J. Soc. 1
(1997).
20. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ("Advisers Act") defines "investment adviser"
to mean "any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others...
as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling
securities ....
" and "person" to mean "a natural person or a company." 15 U.S.C. § 80b2(a)(11), (16) (2000). In this Article, "investment adviser" refers only to companies
providing these services.
21. The interviews for this Article were completed before the data revealed the apparent
difference in the rate of diffusion of QLCCs between operating and investment companies.
None of the lawyers interviewed worked for investment companies.
22. Strang & Soule, supra note 18, at 285.
23. William P. Barnett & Glenn R. Carroll, Modeling Internal OrganizationalChange,
21 Ann. Rev. Soc. 217, 219 (1995).
24. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 14, at 549; see Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is
There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 1097, 1114, 1130
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anonymous complaint hotlines 25 and that corporations are creating other
avenues, such as expanded ombudsmen and compliance functions, for such
complaints to reach the board. It is true that the adoption of a QLCC makes
it structurally very difficult to block a lawyer who wants to go to the board.
But, in the current context, if a lawyer has material evidence of a violation,
the lawyer can still get it to the board. What the absence of a QLCC in this
context means is only that the reporting lawyer and the corporation will lose
the benefits afforded by the QLCC.
The benefits of QLCCs may be analyzed in terms of lawyers'
professional responsibilities. Lawyers appearing before the SEC, and
lawyers under the recently adopted American Bar Association ("ABA")
ethics rules, are permitted to disclose corporate confidential information to
prevent certain types of violations and frauds. 26 An issuer that has
a QLCC, however, gains a safe harbor from some of these
established 27
disclosures.
Fear on the part of issuers that lawyers will make permitted disclosures to
prevent wrongdoing does not appear to exert much pressure on those issuers
to form QLCCs. Only if issuers have formed QLCCs prior to when an
attorney "becomes aware" of evidence of a material violation 2 8 is an
attorney's reporting obligation satisfied by making a report to a QLCC. Yet
operating companies are not forming QLCCs to have them on the shelf in
case an attorney should feel obligated to make a report to the SEC.
Corporate lawyers also do not appear to be pressured by the potential
relaxation of the attorney-client privilege in advocating the formation of
QLCCs. The SEC schema induces lawyers to spread QLCCs: The QLCC
is presented within the SEC's rules regulating attorney professional
conduct 29 and the SEC presents it as an alternative to the SEC's reinscription of a lawyer's professional obligations. 30 The organized bar
strongly resisted the SEC's rules revising their normative obligations.
Lawyers who work for issuers with QLCCs are relieved from these

(2003); Cooley Alerts, New Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Practicing
(2003),
available at
Commission
and
Exchange
the Securities
Before
http://cooley.com/news/alerts.aspx?id=37953920 ("Establishment of a QLCC may also
provide an incentive for the CLO to forward every report to the QLCC prior to any
investigation or selection process by the CLO.").
25. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 776
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.S. § 78j-1 (LexisNexis 2005)).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (2005); Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.6 (2003).
27. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c). The regulation states as follows: "An attorney who reports
evidence of a material violation to such a qualified legal compliance committee has satisfied
his or her obligation to report such evidence and is not required to assess the issuer's
response to the reported evidence of a material violation." Id.
28. Id.
29. 17 C.F.R. § 205 is entitled "Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys
Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer."
30. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c) is entitled "Alternative reporting procedures for attorneys
retained or employed by an issuer that has established a qualified legal compliance
committee."
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contested responsibilities. 31 Law firms who work for issuers with QLCCs
will be protected from associates, or other lawyers whom they hire in the
future, making disclosures that the firm feels are inappropriate. Yet lawyers
who serve issuers are not advising the formation of QLCCs.
The benefits of QLCCs also may be analyzed in terms of their
contributions to corporate governance. The pattern of diffusion of QLCCs
suggests that operating company boards will not become involved in legal
compliance until they are forced to do so. I draw this conclusion based on
two different findings. The diffusion of QLCCs among investment
companies is consistent with these findings.
Based on interviews and published accounts regarding QLCCs, I find that
lawyers believe that the board is an inappropriate forum for the resolution
of legal compliance issues. Lawyers resist board and board committee
involvement in legal compliance through an "ideology of managerialism,"
which makes such involvement culturally inappropriate because legal
compliance decisions are understood to be properly the responsibility of
executives and chief legal officers. The ideology of managerialism pulls
legal compliance decisions away from the board of directors.
Liability standards, I find, push legal compliance decisions away from
the board of directors. Knowledge of the risks being assumed by a
corporation is the most important information that can flow to a board, 32 but
a board committee concerned with legal compliance requires that directors
accept the risk of noncompliance and make determinations of appropriate
levels of risk for not complying with the law. A board committee that deals
with compliance, such as a QLCC, makes such decisions transparent ones.
The board does not seek candor regarding the legal difficulties of corporate
action. The directors want to know that an action is "legal," even when in
fact it risks noncompliance. Given the uncertain state of board liability for
the corporation acting within the bounds of law, directors, often acting on
lawyers' advice, will avoid making legal compliance decisions, especially
ones defining appropriate levels of noncompliance risk. The diffusion of
QLCCs, I conclude, demonstrates limits in "the evolution of business style
and structure toward transparency and accountability. '3 3

31. Id.
32. Donald Langevoort has observed the following:
Most day-to-day strategic business decisions need not be shared with the board...
. What is important on a timely basis, however, is risk disclosure. Extraordinary
forms of risk-taking are, by black-letter corporate law doctrine, for the board in
any event. . . .Especially in today's business environment, where sophisticated
tools for both hedging and assuming risk abound, there is a temptation to assume
greater risk in order to satisfy perceived pressures-whether from the marketplace
or the board itself-to generate high returns. Thus it is risk-related information
that is the underdeveloped substance of the duty of candor we are describing.
Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and
Knowledge, 71 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1187, 1201 (2003).
33. William H. Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity: Lawyer Responsibility for
Collective Misconduct, 22 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 3 (2005).
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Investment companies, on the other hand, do not have employees,
especially a general counsel, who will resist board involvement in legal
compliance by practicing the ideology of managerialism. Furthermore,
investment companies that adopt QLCCs will not do so because of a desire
to be involved in compliance issues, but because their investment advisers
demand such a committee. For investment advisers, investment company
adoption of QLCCs may relieve pressures to limit the advisers' conflicts of
interest with the investment company.
To establish these arguments, this Article proceeds as follows. Part I.A
presents the data on the adoption of QLCCs prior to September 30, 2005.
Part I.B then discusses diffusion processes generally and examines how
those processes explain the data. Part I.C explores the context in which
these QLCCs have been forming. Part II examines two resistances to
diffusion of QLCCs. Part II.A first considers "CLOs at the Coalface,"
exploring the ideology of managerialism.
Part II.B then considers
"Directors at the Coalface?," exploring transparent board involvement in
noncompliance. In response to these resistances, Part III sketches an
argument for an enlarged and un-conflicted secretarial function to assist
board involvement in legal compliance.
An examination of the diffusion of QLCCs reveals that corporate
governance reforms need to consider that executives (including lawyers)
will resist board supervision in the name of professional obligations to
corporate stakeholders. 34
The ideology of managerialism impedes
directorial control. This examination also reveals that corporate governance
reforms will be stymied when reforms do not account for corporations'
involvement in legal noncompliance.
An examination of the diffusion of QLCCs provides another perspective
on the responsibilities of corporate representation. Lawyers responded to
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 35 ("SOX") in terms of their roles as gatekeepers or
whistle-blowers. Considering QLCCs in context reveals that these roles
play out on a sideshow. The center stage is the everyday relations between
the CLO and the Chief Financial Officer ("CFO").
The usual story is that the legal profession has been the victim of the
regulations that the SEC adopted pursuant to SOX. There has been
extensive discussion of the law of lawyering being federalized, instead of
being produced by bar association-dominated state lawmaking. There has
been extensive discussion of the SEC's attack on the lawyer's testimonial
privilege, of the imposition on lawyers of gate-keeping responsibilities, and
of the ill effects of SOX on the attorney-client relationship.
34. See Harvey L. Pitt, Directors' Newest Responsibility Under Sarbanes-Oxley:
Ensuring the Existence of Effective Corporate Compliance and Ethics Programs, Remarks
before the Nat'l Ass'n of Corporate Dirs., D.C. Area 5-6 (Nov. 17, 2004), available at
www.nacdcapital.org/capital/events/november_17th_2004.pdf
(recognizing this resistance
but labeling it a "misperception").
35. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
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The real story is that the corporate bar has been made stronger and richer
by SOX. The ability to maintain confidences is a market asset for lawyers.
SOX has demonstrated that it is not lawyers' only market asset. In the
context of scandals, the SEC has made legal compliance a critical
contingency. Inside the corporation, lawyers are assuming an expanded
jurisdiction. The SEC has sided with lawyers in their battles for intracorporate power with the CFOs. Outside counsel are increasingly involved
in monitoring financial statements and conducting internal corporate
It is within this context of changing roles that the
investigations.
responsibilities of corporate representation must be examined.
I. THE DIFFUSION OF QLCCs
A. The Data
According to reports filed with the SEC, through a search of the SEC's
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval system ("EDGAR")
database, 36 in the approximately three years between October 2002 and
September 30, 2005, 456 issuers have formed QLCCs. As illustrated in the
following table, in the first year, thirty-five issuers formed QLCCs; in the
second year, 273 formed QLCCs; and, in the third year, 148 issuers formed
QLCCs.

36. The data is derived from a search through Westlaw and Lexis of the SEC's
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval system ("EDGAR") that "performs
automated collection, validation, indexing, acceptance, and forwarding of submissions by
companies and others who are required by law to file forms with the U.S. Securities and
EDGAR,
About
Information
SEC,
Important
Commission."
Exchange
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2005). Most documents
required to be filed with the SEC, including proxy statements, are available on EDGAR.
This search method is appropriate, as issuers are defined as those who are required to be
"registered" or "to file reports" or "registration statement[s]." 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(h) (2005).
The companies are listed in the appendix. This method, however, has its limits. It does not
capture, for example, that Sun Microsystems formed a QLCC, as reported on its web page on
Microsystems,
Sun
See
2005.
29,
August
http://www.sun.com/company/cgov/legalcompliance.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). This
information has not reached EDGAR. (It was not reported in Sun Microsystem's 10-K,
which was filed September 13, 2005.) A Google search on "QLCC" and "Qualified Legal
Compliance Committees" was performed in June 2005. The first 900 web pages listed in the
search results were checked. This search revealed that four other companies, in addition to
Broadcom,
QLCCs:
formed
Microsystems,
Sun
http://investor.broadcom.com/phoenix.zhtml ?c= 114961 &p=irol-govCommittee&
Committee=3436 (last visited Nov. 5, 2005); Nelnet, Audit Committee Charter,
http://www.nelnetinvestors.net/corpgov-Audit-CommitteeCharter.cfm (last visited Nov. 5,
Charter,
Committee
Compliance
Corp.,
Games
Scientific
2005);
http://www.scientificgames.com/sgcorp/compliance.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2005); and YP
Corp., Audit Committee Charter http://www.yp.com/audit-committee-charter.php (last
visited Nov. 5, 2005). These five companies are not included in the statistical analysis,
which is restricted to EDGAR. There may be additional companies that have been missed,
but I have no reason to believe that their numbers would alter the conclusion that QLCCs are
rare, if increasingly less rare among investment companies.
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37
Table 1: QLCC Formation

2003: 35
2004: 273
2005: 148
Totals: 456

Operating Companies

Investment Companies

24 (69%)
165 (61%)
42 (28%)
231

11 (31%)
108 (40%)
106 (72%)
225

In the last year, the composition of the issuers forming QLCCs
dramatically shifted. Of the companies establishing QLCCs between
October 2002 and September 30, 2004, 61% were operating companies. In
the twelve months since then, only 28% were operating companies. By
September 30, 2005, almost equal numbers of operating (231) and
investment companies (225) had formed QLCCs. If 2005 patterns continue,
operating companies will be a fast shrinking percentage of the total number
of issuers who have formed QLCCs.
All of the 456 issuers have audit committees and 324 (71%) have
designated their audit committee as a QLCC. Of the operating companies
in the population, thirty-seven (16%) have chosen to form independent
QLCCs, with the remaining adding the QLCC's responsibilities to those of
their audit committee. 38 Ninety-four of the 225 investment companies
(42%) established independent QLLCs. For the investment companies,
however, the number of non-audit QLCCs is overstated, as thirty-five
formed both their audit committees and their QLCCs by appointing all of
their independent directors to them. For these issuers, the QLCC is only
formally, but not substantively, independent from the audit committee. If
these thirty-five companies are excluded, then 74% of the investment
companies assigned their audit committees the additional responsibility of
serving as a QLCC.
The only other data on QLCCs of which I am aware is a study reported to
have been performed by Skadden, Arps.39 Skadden, Arps examined the
6778 companies that filed an annual proxy statement between October 1,
2003, and October 26, 2004. Of these, 165 companies (or 2.4%) had
formed QLCCs. Of those companies, the ones listed on the NYSE had a
37. The years are measured beginning October 1 of the prior year and ending on
September 30 of the year named.
38. This percentage of operating companies forming independent QLCCs may be
overstated. For example, OmnicomGroup is counted in the data as having created a separate
QLCC. But, on inspection, it turns out that "[t]he QLCC shall be comprised of the current
members of the Company's
Audit Committee."
OmnicomGroup
Website,
http://www.omnicomgroup.com/Governance/ OC223940623/Responsibilities_4 (last visited
Nov. 2, 2005). A Skadden, Arps survey found that eighty-two percent (135 of 165) of
issuers designated the audit committee as the QLCC. Skadden Arps, QLCC Survey (2004)
[hereinafter QLCC Survey] (on file with author).
Another ten named the
nominating/governance committee as the QLCC, and only twenty (twelve percent) formed a
separate QLCC. Id.
39. QLCC Survey, supra note 38.
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slightly higher rate of QLCC formation (forty-seven of 1664, or 2.8%).
These numbers are not incompatible with the ones presented above.
The Skadden, Arps survey emphasized the percentage of NYSE
companies with QLCCs. If one looks at the percentage of companies with
QLCCs that are listed on the NYSE, a different perspective is provided.
Only 15% of issuers are listed on the NYSE (2800 of 18,200). Of the
companies with QLCCs, 105 (23%) are listed. In the first year, 34% of the
companies forming QLCCs (twelve of thirty-five) were NYSE-listed. In
the second year, 26% were NYSE-listed. Between October 1, 2004, and
September 30, 2005, 13% of the companies forming QLCCs (nineteen of
148) were NYSE-listed. Although the numbers are too small to have
an influence
statistical confidence, NYSE listing did initially appear to have
40
on whether a company board decided to establish a QLCC.
Three patterns have been observed in the diffusion of innovations
through corporate board actions. The first pattern looks like an elongated
"S," with a tail in which there are few adoptions and then a quick jump in
adoptions, followed by another tail picking up the laggards. For example,
although there was controversy regarding its use, in just two years, 75% of
Fortune 200 companies and over 50% of another group of companies began
to fully expense their Investment Tax Credit.4 1 Similarly, in less than two
years, 42 60% of the 100 largest companies had taken board action to limit
the effects of revised NYSE listing requirements. 43 A similar pattern is
observed in the adoption of poison pills: In the twelve months following a
court ruling that allowed for corporate adoption of poison pills without
44
shareholder approval, 30% of Fortune 500 firms adopted poison pills.
Poison pill diffusion had a greater percentage of laggards, and an additional
45
25% of Fortune 500 firms adopted poison pills over the next three years.
The second pattern of diffusion is characterized by less dramatic but
constant growth. This pattern looks like a straight but not very steep line.
Golden parachutes, for example, in contrast to the innovations just
described, spread more slowly. Golden parachutes experienced constant
40. Neither the total number of QLCC companies that are listed on the NYSE nor the
numbers for 2005 are significant at the .05 level (i.e., under the chi square test). In the first
two years, the selection results produce statistical confidence at that level.
41. Stephen J. Mezias, An Institutional Model of OrganizationalPractice: Financial
Reporting at the Fortune200, 35 Admin. Sci. Q. 431, 437 (1990).
42. The proposed NYSE Rules were proposed on June 6, 2002. See Fenwick & West
LLP, NYSE Report on Proposed Changes to Corporate Governance Rules (2002), available
http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/publications/corporate/sec/Corp-Sec-06-07-02.pdf.
at,
They became effective on November 4, 2003. See Jenner & Block, Corporate Resource
Center (2003), http://corp.jenner.com/alert details_1079486644640.html.
43. Shearman & Sterling LLP, Corporate Governance Practices of the 100 Largest U.S.
Public Companies 20 (2004). This study examined only documents available as of June 15,
2004. Id. at 2 n.4.
44. See Gerald F. Davis, Agents Without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill
Through the Intercorporate Network, 36 Admin. Sci. Q. 583, 587 (1991) (discussing the

rapid adoption of poison pills during the year following the publication of Moran v.
Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985)).

45. See id.
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growth over a seven-year period in the 1980s,
until they were found at 50%
46
of publicly traded Fortune 500 companies.
The third pattern of diffusion is the absence of significant contagion.
Judging from the decline in the numbers of companies forming QLCCs
between 2004 and 2005, one might conclude that QLCCs simply will not
diffuse. As more time passes from the SEC's adoption of regulations
pursuant to SOX, fewer companies will pay attention to the QLCC
alternative. At least until some other shoe drops, the vast majority of
companies will ignore QLCC. But judging from only twelve months of
data, this conclusion may be too hasty. More important, the broad
conclusion that QLCCs will not diffuse does not account for the consistency
in the number of investment companies that are announcing in prospectuses
QLCC formation.
From the 2005 data, the QLCC adoption process appears to be different
for investment than for operating companies. The number of investment
companies with QLCCs almost doubled in 2005. This is weak evidence,
however, for the diffusion among them following the S-shaped pattern, as it
represents only a 3% increase in the number of investment companies with
QLCCs. 47 But it may indicate that QLCCs will have continuing growth,
which may even out to a straight line.
Among operating companies, the diffusion of QLCCs is well captured by
two different law firm memos. According to the Skadden, Arps 2004
survey, seven of the Fortune 100 corporations had formed QLCCs prior to
October 26, 2004.48 According to a 2004 Shearman & Sterling survey, of
the "100 Largest U.S. Public Companies," sixty had specifically responded
to NYSE listing requirements and limited their boards' responsibility for
legal and regulatory compliance prior to June 15, 2004. 49
B. Pressuresthat May Result in Diffusion
The diffusion of organizational innovations results from coercive,
mimetic, and normative pressures. 50 The exertion of these various forms of
pressure upon issuers could foster QLCC adoption.

46. Davis & Greve, supra note 19, at 3, 29.
47. There are at least 3060 investment companies. Customer Identification Program for
Mutual Funds, Proposed Rule, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,657, 2002 SEC
LEXIS 1836, at *38 (July 15, 2002) (to be codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. § 103.131 and
17 C.F.R. § 270.0-11).
48. QLCC Survey, supra note 38.

49. See Shearman & Sterling LLP, supra note 43, at 20. The list of the "100 Largest
U.S. Public Companies" was generated from the Fortune 500 list, restricting it to the top 100
companies listed on the NYSE. Id. at 2 n.1.
50. Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in OrganizationalFields, 48 Am. Soc. Rev. 147,

147-60 (1983).
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1. Coercive Pressures
The SEC has not required issuers to form QLCCs. The SEC acts only as
a cheerleader for QLCCs, and exerts some pressures and offers some
incentives to form them. 5 1 The SEC has not indirectly coerced their
formation by requiring lawyers to disclose evidence of violations to the
SEC, or to make "noisy withdrawals," unless the organization has a QLCC
in place. It has been predicted that, should the SEC mandate disclosure or
52
noisy withdrawals, adoptions of QLCCs will rapidly increase.
The SEC provides issuers that have formed QLCCs with the benefit of
limiting the obligations of lawyers to demand an appropriate response from
the issuer only when the QLCC was formed prior to when an attorney
"bec[a]me[] aware" of evidence of a material violation. 53 The requirement
that the QLCC must be preexisting in order for the issuer to obtain the
54
benefit could exert pressures on issuers to establish QLCCs.
Board adoptions of QLCCs also may be coerced as conditions of
settlements with prosecutors. The adoption of a QLCC may become part of
a settlement agreement to enable the issuer to indicate that it is committed
to institutionalizing all "means of effective corporate governance. '55 As
these settlements are private, it is difficult to determine the extent to which
51. See, e.g., Pitt, supra note 34, at 9-10 (advising corporations to "[tireat the sentencing
guidelines as if they are formal regulatory requirements" and advising corporations of the
benefits of QLCCs).
52. Bart Schwartz & Jonathan Freedman, Qualified Legal Compliance Committees and
Attorney Conduct, N.Y. L.J., May 22, 2003, at 5. The inability of companies to assert an
attorney-client privilege may change this prediction. A safe harbor is not of much value if
"[ftor all practical purposes, the attorney-client privilege no longer exists, whether for inside
counsel or outside counsel." Eric J.Lyman, Impact on CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege
May Not Be All Bad, Some IBA Panelists Say, ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Prof'l
Conduct, Mar. 10, 2004, at 20 (quoting William Lytton, General Counsel for Tyco
International). Digimarc Corporation has a QLCC and apparently believes that the SEC has
adopted the noisy withdrawal rule. See Digimarc Corp., Standards of Professional Conduct
for
Legal
Personnel
4,
available
at
http://www.digimarc.com/docs/corp-gov-conduct-legal.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2005).
53. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c) (2005).
54. Of course, this pressure is felt only if the preexisting requirement is understood. At
least one company appears to have been misadvised in this regard. For example, Husker AG
Processing LLC's "Code of Ethics for Principal Executive and Senior Financial Officers"
provides as follows:
In its discretion, with respect to any particular investigation, the Company
Board of Directors, upon a majority vote of the independent directors of the
Company, may direct the Audit Committee functions set forth herein to a
Qualified Legal Compliance Committee (as described in 17 CFR Part 205,
implementing Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act), which Qualified Legal
Compliance Committee shall have all the rights and obligations established in this
Code for the Audit Committee, and as granted by applicable law.
Husker AG, LLC Code of Ethics for Principal Executive and Senior Financial Officers,
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/l 133555/000114420404003917/v02296_ex99-1 .txt
(last visited Nov. 5, 2005). The company and the QLCC will not have the rights "granted by
applicable law" in the particular investigation that led the board to create the QLCC.
55. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg.
6296, 6305 (Feb. 6, 2003) (final rule).
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they have occurred. But, in at least one case, a proxy statement announced
entry of an agreement with the SEC
both the formation of a QLCC and the
56
and the New York Attorney General.
Anticipation of regulatory action and sanctions also may create pressures
to form QLCCs. One factor that the SEC has announced that it considers in
settling and sanctioning is whether a company has a procedure for reporting
violations to a committee composed solely of independent directors. 5 7 U.S.
Attorneys' decisions, too, depend on whether "the directors [have]
established an information and reporting system.., to allow them to reach
an informed decision regarding the organization's compliance with the
law." 5 8 Recognizing issuer dependence on regulatory action also can lead
to the adoption of QLCCs: The presence of a QLCC can signal compliance
off investigations or influencing the charging
to the regulators, fending
59
decisions of prosecutors.
56. See Security Capital Real Estate Mutual Funds Inc., Proxy Statement (Sched. 14(a)),
Exhibit E, at E-1 (Oct. 8, 2004), available at http://www.secinfo.com/dl 1MXs. 1TE7.htm.
57. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency
Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969, 2001 SEC LEXIS 2210, at *7
(Oct. 23, 2001) (considering whether "management, the Board or committees consisting
solely of outside directors overs[aw] the review" to be a factor in determining whether to
take enforcement action against an issuer).
58. David M. Nissman, Corporate Crime Prevention Programs, U.S. Att'ys Bull., Nov.
available
at
at
23,
27,
2003,

(quoting
Federal
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usab5106.pdf
Prosecutions of Business Organizations, Criminal Resource Manual No. 162, § VII.B
(2003)).
59. As one law firm has recognized,
The most important advantage .. .of a QLCC in terms of interaction with
criminal authorities, is the potential to convince the prosecutor not to charge the
company in the first place .... The existence of a substantial and respected QLCC
might sway the ultimate decision of a prosecutor or her supervisor. Finally, the
government will be dealing with a group of people-the QLCC members and their
outside attorneys-significantly removed from the company, which may bring
down tensions on both sides and comfort the government when making its final
decision.
Joseph T. McLaughlin et al.,
Heller Ehrman, Qualified Legal Compliance Committee:
Policies and Procedures 14 (2003) (law firm memo) (on file with author). Paradoxically, the
sentencing guidelines operate so that there may appear to be no need for board oversight.
The practice of conditioning sentence reductions on corporations' telling the government
everything as soon as they find it has become so common that the ABA has condemned the
practice. See ABA Panels Probe Damage U.S. Tactics May Inflict on Corporate Attorney

Privilege, 74 U.S.L.W. 2095 (2005). The American Bar Association ("ABA") House of
Delegates in August 2005 approved a resolution that "the American Bar Association opposes
the routine practice by government officials of seeking to obtain a waiver of the attorneyclient privilege or work product doctrine through the grant or denial of any benefit or
advantage." ABA Leaders CounterRecent Assaults on Attorney-Client Privilege, Respectfor

Judges, 74 U.S.L.W. 2091 (2005). Although lawyers have complained to me that they are
being forced to act as the government's agents, not the corporation's, they also have said that
they see no need for a board process to direct their disclosures. That they see no need for
board involvement despite their predicament may derive from the current use of the
sentencing guidelines, as the lawyers believe that the board will have no choice but to
disclose everything. See infra notes 205-10 (discussing the ideology of managerialism).
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Coercive pressures from lawyers who work for an issuer also may result
in the diffusion of QLCCs. Lawyers may coerce the diffusion of QLCCs by
not working for issuers that do not form them. "It seems likely that many
prudent lawyers and firms will decline to represent public companies that
lack a Qualified Legal Compliance Committee," predicted the New York
County Lawyer's Association ("NYCLA"). 60 The Attorneys' Liability
Assurance Society ("ALAS"), whose interests lie in minimizing lawyer
malpractice judgments, was one of the few supporters of giving lawyers
access to the board through QLCCs, labeling the SEC's provision of the
QLCC alternative as "a good example of creative and constructive... rule6
making." 1
Large firms, especially, might fear liability because they employ large
numbers of fresh associates, who may have "unrealistic" ethical standards.
"Nafve" attorneys have been predicted to make reports to QLCCs 62 and,
accordingly, also may be predicted to be more likely to make reports to the
SEC. Large firms have economic incentives to retain clients and are
unlikely to reward any of their attorneys who act as squeaky cops. The
prospect of evading unfortunate involvements is likely to be discounted
against the present loss of all kinds of work subsequent to a voluntary SEC
disclosure. The specter of the na've or ethical associate may well have
induced law firms to coerce companies into forming QLCCs.
Apparently, most attorneys are not "prudent," in the language of the
NYCLA, 63 not fearful of ethical challenges from their associates, and are
willing to risk the liability that may result from material violations they
could have blocked had they had access to the board.
Coercive pressures need not be so obvious. For example, if cultural
expectations had developed so that boards investigate instances of legal
noncompliance as a matter of course, these expectations would have
constituted coercive pressure for the adoption of QLCCs.
Perhaps
surprisingly, even after Enron and subsequent multiple corporate
investigations, director prosecutions, and impositions of liability, there
appears to be only very weak cultural pressure upon operating companies to
64
form QLLCs.
60. Letter from N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y of the SEC,
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/edrobertsonI.htm (last visited Nov.
21, 2005) [hereinafter Letter from N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n]. A prudent attorney
requires the QLCC to enable her "to avoid the consequences of considering" how to respond
to corporate action, where "a mistake ... or error of judgment could lead to censure or other
penalty to the firm as a whole." Id.; see also Fisch & Gentile, supra note 14, at 551.

61. Comments of ALAS on SEC's Proposed Rule on Lawyer Conduct, 17 C.F.R. § 205,
at 26 (2002), available at http://evergreenethics.com/SEC/ALAS.pdf.
62. Audrey Strauss, CorporateCrime: QualifiedLegal Compliance Committees: Pros
and Cons, N.Y. L.J., May 1, 2003, at 5.

63. Letter from N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, supra note 60.
64. Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP warns that "Corporate America remains only a major
scandal or two away from another round of regulation. Therefore, a narrow approach to
compliance with governance reforms is dangerous, not only from the perspective of the
individual corporation, but from the perspective of Corporate America as a whole." Weil,
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For investment companies, SEC registration supplies a crucial resource.
Investment companies also are more heavily regulated by the SEC than are
operating companies. Investment companies are therefore more dependent
on the SEC. This greater dependence can cause SEC pressures to be more
coercive. 65 This may explain the diffusion of QLCCs among 1940 Act
registrants.
Another explanation for the diffusion of QLCCs among 1940 Act
registrants is the dependence on the SEC, not of the issuer, but of the
issuer's investment adviser. The investment adviser also is dependent on
the SEC. 66 Investment advisers may form QLCCs at mutual funds to
demonstrate to regulators that the investment advisers are concerned about
their conflicts of interest with "their" investment company.
QLCCs at investment companies may be mechanisms of governance, not
for the funds, but for their investment advisers. QLCCs at investment
companies, however, would give an investment adviser the benefit of
limiting its lawyers' obligation to determine whether the investment adviser
has made an appropriate response when any of its lawyers discover that the
adviser is causing an investment company to commit a material violation.
In such a case, a lawyer to an investment adviser would not need to raise the
issue with his or her employer (the adviser). She could report the matter to
the investment company's QLCC.
Operating company violations of law and breaches of fiduciary duty are
normally the result of actions by employees, managers, and executives of
the company. In only some cases is the action the product of a conflict of
interest between the actor and the company. And, except when top
executives are pursuing their own interests, conflict of interest problems
would never reach the QLCC, because the company would shut down the
agents who are acting on their own, rather than the company's, interests.
Unlike violations at operating companies, however, violations of law and
breaches of fiduciary duty for 1940 Act registrants are the acts, not of
employees of the investment company, but of affiliated persons and
companies, such as promoters, underwriters, investment advisers,
67
administrators, transfer agents, custodians, and outside auditors.
Investment companies are externally managed and typically have no
employees of their own.
These affiliated persons and companies have inherent and ongoing
conflicts of interest with the investment company. There is extensive
regulation of these conflicts, such as of purchases and sales of registrant's

Gotshal & Manges LLP, Ten Board Challenges for 2005, at 2 (2005), available at
http://www.nacdonline.org/images/WeilAlert-l-10-0S.pdf.

65. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 50, at 150-5 1.
66. See, e.g., Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2000).
67. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520,
2004 SEC LEXIS 1582, July 27, 2004, at *6 n.6 (listing recent litigation against these
parties).
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securities 68 or the compensation paid to these affiliated persons. 69
Nonetheless, in early 2004, the SEC saw "a serious breakdown in
management controls. [The SEC] observed that, in some cases, the fund
was used for the benefit of fund insiders, often the management company or
its employees." 70 Even with a majority of independent directors, 7 1 "a fund
adviser is frequently in a position to dominate the board because of the
adviser's monopoly over information about the fund and its frequent ability
'72
to control the board's agenda."
Unlike at operating companies, all the matters likely to go to a QLCC at a
mutual fund or investment trust concern conflicts of interest. And these
conflicts may be more difficult to manage than those at operating
companies. If the members of an investment company QLCC seek
"independent legal counsel," they may hire an attorney even though the
attorney has represented the investment adviser in the past, and even if,
during the representation of the investment company, the attorney
"materially increase[s]" her representation of the investment adviser. 73
Operating companies can fire executives much more readily than
investment companies can fire their advisers. In fact, "the termination of
advisory agreements is so rare as to be practically nonexistent. '74 In part,
this is because shareholders invest by seeking the wisdom of a particular
investment adviser. In one case, shareholders fought to retain a terminated
adviser by rejecting the fund's new advisory contract. 75 Investment
companies also are constrained in firing their advisers because they lack the
internal resources that operating companies possess to carry on during
management or board successions. Investment advisers also are entrenched
because investment companies lack a market for corporate control.
At investment companies, lawyers who make a report to the QLCC do so
about their employer's breaches.
At operating companies, lawyers
normally report to the QLCC about the corporation's employees' breaches.
In most operating company contexts, an attorney who reports to a QLCC
has some hope that the company will reward that report by giving the
lawyer more work in the future. In the investment company context, as the
company does not assign legal work, there is no such hope.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

15 U.S.C. § 80a-17.
See id.; 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1 (2005).
Investment Company Governance, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1582, at *4.
See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(b)(2).
Investment Company Governance, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1582, at *7.
17 C.F.R. § 270.0-1(a)(6)(B)(iii) (2000).
Birdthistle, supra note 9. But see Navellier v. Sletten, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 201 (Ct.

App. 2003). Birdthistle notes that, "[d]espite the widespread industry abuses, no investment
advisor has had its advisory agreement terminated or allowed to lapse." Birdthistle, supra
note 9. Michael F. Price, a former industry leader, has said, "You know what the shocking
thing to me is? That nobody has had a contract canceled by a board of directors. Even
where a chairman was messing around with the fund, the board didn't cancel the contract.
What does it take to get fired in this business?" Id. (citations and internal quotations
omitted).

75. See Navellier, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 201.

2005]

RESISTANCES TO REFORMING

1267

At investment companies, QLCCs "solve" the problem presented by the
possibility that a report about the fund adviser's violation will be going to
another employee of the fund adviser, who serves as the fund's functional
CLO or CEO. 76 Litigation against investment advisers, settlement or
anticipation of such litigation, or publicity about the advisers' conflicts of
interest with funds may have led to the diffusion of QLCCs to investment
companies. 77 But the ability of QLCCs to monitor investment adviser
violations needs to be demonstrated.
2. Mimetic Pressures
Mimetic pressures also might induce issuers to form QLCCs. Mimetic
pressures emerge because the search for certainty leads organizations to
behave in a manner that is consistent with what are generally perceived to
be the industry's "best practices." Business and social contacts among
directors also may generate imitative isomorphisms. These contacts
produce what has been called "business scan," and has been used to explain
why boards choose to undertake certain actions, such as expansion through
takeovers, adoption of poison pills, awarding "golden parachutes" to
78
management, and increasing CEO compensation.
QLCCs are not now best practices, one might argue, because there are so
few QLCCs and, consequently, few directors have been exposed to their
virtues. Mimetic pressures will grow as the business community sees more
and more QLCCs. Then, they will become part of business scan and
QLCCs will diffuse in sufficient number so that imitations will cascade.
The current rate of diffusion, however, cannot be explained by an
absence of mimetic pressures. "[C]entral firms to the larger business
community" are normally inducers of strong mimetic pressures and key
sites for business scan. 79 General Motors ("GM") was an early adopter. 80
What is good for General Motors, however, does not appear to be good for
most of the rest of corporate America. Moreover, in addition to GM,
boards at Bank One, Bear Steams, Cell Genesys, Citrix Systems, Clorox,
Gap, Hilton Hotels, Johnson Controls, Manpower, MGM, PepsiAmericas,
Petsmart, Reynolds America, Sara Lee, Teledyne, Time Warner, and

76. In the absence of a CLO, lawyers typically report to a Chief Executive Officer
("CEO"). "But the fund's CEO, often assigned such a designation for the sake of signing off
on fund financial statements, is most likely an officer of the advisor-a potential conflict of
interest that should be a red flag for directors." Directors Need to Choose Planfor Conduct
Rules, Fund Directions, July 2003, at 2.
77. See Conduct Rules Challenged by Market Timing Investigations, Fund Directions,

Nov. 2003, at 5. It should be noted that advisers may have a preference for the fund creating
a QLCC rather than hiring an independent (from the adviser) CLO.
78. See Strang & Soule, supra note 18, at 273, 275, 279 (listing sources).
79. Id. at 276 (citations omitted).
80. Foley & Lardner LLP, How to Implement an In-House Legal "Up the Ladder"
Reporting
System
9
(2004),
http://www.foley.con/files/tbls3 1Publications/FileUploadl 37/2252/UptheLadder.pdf.
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Williams-Sonoma have all adopted QLCCs. 81 Other companies do not
appear to want to keep up with these "Joneses." Thus, there appears to be
strong resistance to whatever mimetic pressures exist.
3. Normative Pressures
Normative isomorphic pressures derive from ideas carried by change
agents. Besides Congress, regulators, prosecutors, and courts, one group of
change agents that might have exerted normative pressures leading to the
adoption of QLCCs is the organized bar. The ABA Task Force on
Corporate Responsibility's report (the "Cheek Report") called for "a
committee of independent directors" to meet "regularly [in] executive
session" with the CLO "to report concerns" regarding "material
violations.., of law" and breaches of fiduciary duty. 82 The ABA report
also recognized that, sometimes, outside counsel may have to communicate
directly with the board. 8 3 It recommended that the board create a
committee, such as "a legal compliance committee," charged "with
responsibility to obtain and evaluate.., information about violations ' or
potential violations of law and breaches 85of fiduciary dut[ies]. "84
Nonetheless, the ABA has not endorsed QLCCs.
Shareholders also might have applied normative pressures inducing the
That a significant percentage of the largest
diffusion of QLCCs.
corporations have adopted QLCCs suggests that they believe that QLCCs
signal, to shareholders, quality governance. 86 Nonetheless, Institutional

81. See infra app. The QLCC Survey conducted by Skadden, Arps found that thirty-five
of the 165 adopters were Fortune 500 companies, with fifteen in the Fortune 250 and seven
in the Fortune 100. QLCC Survey, supra note 38. General Motors and Time Warner are in
List
2005,
See
Fortune
500
Companies
the
Fortune
50.
http://www.lead411.com/fortune500a.taf (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
82. Cheek Report, supra note 14, at 32, 36-39.
83. Id. at 40 n.72; see also id. at 69.
84. Id. at 70-71.
85. See Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., Pres., Am. Bar Ass'n, to Jonathan G. Katz,
at
18,
2002),
available
SEC
(Dec.
Sec'y,
(emphasizing that "[legal
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/apcarltonl.htm
compliance systems need to be flexible."); see also Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., Pres.,
Am. Bar Ass'n, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Apr. 2, 2003), available at
understand
the
("We
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/aba040203.htm
Commission's desire to influence corporate governance structures and agree with the
desirability of encouraging independent committees to address legal compliance matters.
However, we believe that this is best done in other ways, such as stock exchange listing
standards, Commission disclosure requirements or recognition of best practices.").
86. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. However, there is also evidence that
corporations that are demonstrably concerned with governance do not necessarily believe
that the formation of QLCCs is necessary for quality governance. For example, of the more
than seventy companies that have joined Ceres-a voluntary organization with member
corporations and investment funds committed to compliance and transparency with respect
to economic, social, and environmental performance-only two have formed QLCCs. See
Ceres, http://www.ceres.org/ceres/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
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Shareholder Services 87 does not include QLCCs as a factor in rating quality
corporate governance. 88 In the 2004 proxy season, among the 10089 largest
companies, there were no shareholder proposals relating to QLCCs.
The SEC remains the main cheerleader for QLCCs. The SEC asserts that
QLCCs offer benefits beyond preventing those violations reported by
attorneys. A board decision to form a QLCC gives legal compliance
increased visibility and legitimacy. The QLCC "may also produce broader
synergistic benefits, such as heightening awareness of the importance of
early reporting of possible material violations so that they can be prevented
or stopped." 90 Even if the QLCC never convenes, the adoption of a QLCC
institutionalizes the board's commitment to compliance.
This section has reviewed possible bases for the diffusion of QLCCs.
Part II, below, considers the resistance to these pressures. The next section
considers the context in which QLCCs are diffusing.
C. The Context

"Where were the lawyers?" Judge Stanley Sporkin's question 91 after the
Savings and Loan crisis also was prominently asked after the Enron-led

scandals. 92 This call led to a response by lawyers arguing for and against
the advisability of new regulation.
Both the call and the response are trumpeted by the instruments of

morality and high politics.

Any student of corporate law, however,

87. See Institutional Shareholder Services, http://www.issproxy.com/about/index.jsp
Institutional Shareholder Services "provides corporate
(last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
governance solutions that enhance the interaction between shareholders and companies,
designed to help shareholders manage risks and drive values." Institutional Shareholders,
supra (Mission Statement).
Services,
Rating
Criteria,
88. See
Institutional
Shareholder
http://www.isscgq.conratingcriteria.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2005). When Institutional
Shareholders Services hinted that it might include QLCCs in its rating scheme, both Susan
Hackett of the Association of Corporate Counsel and Arthur H. Bill of Foley & Lardner
"expressed ...concern." Foley & Lardner LLP, supra note 80, at 9.
89. Shearman & Sterling LLP, supra note 43, at 16.
90. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg.
6296, 6309 (Feb. 6, 2003) (final rule).
91. See Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990). The
exact text of Judge Stanley Sporkin's question reads as follows:
Where were these [accountants and lawyers], a number of whom are now
asserting their rights under the Fifth Amendment, when these clearly improper
transactions were being consummated?
Why didn't any of them speak up or disassociate themselves from the
transactions?
Where also were the outside accountants and attorneys when these transactions
were effectuated?
What is difficult to understand is that with all the professional talent involved
(both accounting and legal), why at least one professional would not have blown
the whistle to stop the overreaching that took place in this case.
Id. at 920.
92. See Dan Ackman, Enron: Now the Recriminations, Forbes.com, Nov. 30, 2001,
http://www.forbes.com/2001/11/30/1130topnews.html.
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93
recognizes this call and response. It is the song of Smith v. Van Gorkom.
94
It is the song of a full employment act for lawyers.
As the lawyers actually were there, Judge Sporkin's question is restated
in professional tones as, "Why weren't the lawyers independent?" This
question suggests that professional incentives can become aligned with
ethical behavior. In light of the failure of professional incentives in the
1990s, "why weren't the lawyers independent?" is a call for a change in
professional incentives. The trumpeted response is that of increased
responsibilities for, and restrictions on, lawyers. Less noticed, however, is
that the response also includes increased funding of lawyers.
SOX reforms may be understood from a command-and-control
perspective. The question "why weren't the lawyers independent?" is
answered by changing ethical and legal directives.
SOX reforms may be understood by examining the organization of the
professions. From afar, greater economic independence is a proxy for
greater behavioral independence. Rebuilding "professional independence"
led to a reimposition of practices in which professionals and people not in
the profession do not share control or profits. 95 Rebuilding professional
96
legitimacy led to formal divisions of multidisciplinary practices.
93. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). In Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court held that
the defendant corporation's board of directors "violated its fiduciary duty of care to
shareholders and thus was subject to massive personal liability for failing to devote sufficient
attention to process and advocacy before approving a cash-out merger offer which would
have given shareholders a substantial premium over the pre-merger market price for their
securities." Jonathan R. Macey, The Transformation of the American Law Institute, 61 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1212, 1220 (1993).
94. See Macey, supra note 93, at 1221 (predicting that the natural result of decisions like
Van Gorkom is the "transfer of wealth from the business community to the legal and
investment banking communities"). But see Helen M. Bowers, Fairness Opinions and the
Business Judgment Rule: An Empirical Investigation of Target Firms' Use of Fairness
Opinions, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 567 (2002) (finding no change over time in corporate use of
fairness opinions or in revenues earned by financial advisers).
95. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof I Conduct R. 5.4(d) (2002). The Rule provides that
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation
or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative
of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a
reasonable time during administration;
(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof... ; or
(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a
lawyer.
Id.
96. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201, 116 Stat. 745, 771-72
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §78j-1 (2000 & Supp. 2003)); see also Sydney M. Cone, III, Five
Years Later: Reconsidering the OriginalABA Report on MDP, 29 Law & Soc. Inquiry 597,
597 (2004) (discussing the attempt by the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice to
"deal with questions of legal ethics that might arise if the practice of law by lawyers were
integrated into an enterprise in which nonlawyers had a significant degree of ultimate
control"); Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, The Confrontation Between the Big Five and
Big Law: Turf Battles and Ethical Debatesas Contestsfor Professional Credibility,29 Law
& Soc. Inquiry 615 (2004) (describing practices of professional firm competition as driven
by legitimacy processes); Bryant G. Garth & Carole Silver, The MDP Challenge in the
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SOX reforms may also be understood by examining their market effects.
Accountants lost access to profits from consultants, but they gained internal
control and other work. Inside counsel gained compliance work and a more
prominent seat at the table (without having to forsake stock options).
Outside counsel gained internal investigation work and increased opinion
work. Lawyers and accountants are as much the beneficiaries of SOX as
7
they are its subjects.

9

The lawyer, qua lawyer, hears SOX and discusses attorney-client
privilege. The lawyer, qua businessperson, hears SOX and discusses
opportunities for engagements and power.9 8 Businesspeople, among others,
railing about the costs of implementing SOX, are begrudging fees earned by
lawyers.
Remember the corporate world before this wave of scandals struck.
Auditors both inside and outside the corporation had fallen under the
tutelage of the consultants. Internal auditors faced the outsourcing of their
function and external audits were priced as loss leaders to sell consulting
services. Auditors curried favor with and99sought to become consultants,
especially in the Big Five accounting firms.
Within the corporation, the CLO had fallen under the tutelage of the
CFO. 0 0 In the early 1980s, one study found that, of CEOs with graduate
training, more had law degrees than any other degree. A greater percentage
of these CEOs had JDs (32.1%) than MBAs (30%).101 In the early 1990s,

Context of Globalization, 52 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 903, 910-12 (2002) (discussing why law
firms that have affiliated with nonlegal professional services firms to form multidisciplinary
practices have an interest in lawyers maintaining exclusive control over the law practices).
97. SOX generated markets by "varying the definition of risk" that is acceptable to the
SEC: "Demands, and thus markets, of a completely new type can be createdby varying the
definition of risk, especially demand for the avoidance of risk." Ulrich Beck, Risk Society:
Toward a New Modernity 56 (1992), quoted in Marieke de Goede, Repoliticizing Financial
Risk, 33 Econ. & Soc'y 197, 197 (2004).
98. As one lawyer put it, "The bad news is Sarbanes-Oxley has created a lot of work for
us. But the good news is it's engaging more people in the business to understand what we
do." The Roundtable, The Regulatory Aftermath: One Year Later, GCs Struggle to Decipher
Sarbanes-Oxley, Corp. Legal Times, Sept. 2003, at 44, 46 [hereinafter The Roundtable]
(remarks of Jeffrey B. Kindler, General Counsel of Pfizer, Inc.).
99. See Robert Eli Rosen, As the Big 5 Become Multi-Disciplinary Practices,
OpportunitiesAbound for Tax Executives, 51 Tax Executive 147 (1999).
100. Of the fifty Fortune 500 companies that responded to a 2000 survey, 70%
compensated the CLO less than the CFO. Heidrick & Struggles, The Fortune 500 CEO
Survey on General Counsels (2000).
See generally Michele D. Beardslee, If
Multidisciplinary PartnershipsAre Introduced into the United States, What Could or Should
be the Role of General Counsel?, 9 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 1, 75 (2003) ("As one
general counsel explained, CFOs (in other companies) are already trying to convince senior
management to have the in-house legal department report to them."); Dirk M. Zorn, Here a
Chief There a Chief: The Rise of the CFO in the American Firm, 69 Am. Soc. Rev. 345
(2004) (documenting diffusion of the CFO's role). For a discussion of the intra-corporate
battles between CLOs and CFOs in the context of multidisciplinary practices, see Beardslee,
supra,at 58-67.
101. Tom Priest & John Krol, Lawyers in Corporate Chief Executive Positions: Career
Characteristicsand "Inner Group Membership," 14 Int. J. of Soc. of L. 33, 38 (1986); Tom
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however, according to another study, more than three times as many CEOs
had a finance background as had a legal one. 10 2 During the 1990s, the
widespread financial manipulations to influence stock prices furthered the
10 3
power of the CFO.
The legal department had become balkanized by the hiring decisions of
self-managing project teams. 1°4 Inside counsel found that they could only
infrequently gain support for their opinions by reporting up the ladder
within the legal department. 105
And as compliance became risk
management, and as corporate cultures emphasized risk taking, inside
counsel had diminished ability to differentiate legal risks from all the other
106
risks that a project faced.
Corporate law firms were locked in competition internally over
compensation and externally over clients. Both corporate legal departments
and multidisciplinary practices competed with law firms for work. The Big
Five accounting firms were the goliath multidisciplinary practices that, after
transforming the European legal profession, were threatening the American
bar. Lawyers were jumping ship and doubling their salaries by joining the
Big Five. Law firms were reorganizing. Rather than being organized by
legal specialization, they were becoming organized by industry and client.
In larger firms, "client relationship partners" succeeded, rather than client
107
finders.
Professional production was demand driven. Commodification, postFordist production technologies, and predatory competition marked
professional work. Professionals provided that which those who hired them
desired.
What has changed?
The last decade of the twentieth century among the U.S. corporate elite
resembled the last decade of the nineteenth century among European swells.
Priest & R. A. Rothman, Lawyers in Corporate Chief Executive Positions: A Historical
Analysis of Careers, 12 Work & Occupations 131 (1985).
102. William Ocasio & Hyosun Kim, The Circulationof Corporate Control: Selection of
FunctionalBackgrounds of New CEOs in Large U.S. Manufacturing Firms, 1981-1992, 44
Admin. Sci. Q. 532, 548 (1999). According to this study, ten years earlier, in 1982, twice as
many CEOs had a finance background than had a legal one. Id. This study did not examine
graduate degrees. Consequently, it is impossible to know from it how many CEOs,
including those who had finance backgrounds, had JD degrees. Nevertheless, it does suggest
some skepticism towards the findings reported in supra note 101.
103. Jonathan Weil, What's the PIE Ratio? Well, Depends on What Is Meant by
Earnings, Wall St. J., Aug. 21, 2001, at Al (reporting that more than 300 companies of the
S&P 500 improperly capitalized expenses). "In fact, for every dollar of operating earnings
S&P 500 companies reported for their most recent three-month periods, 60 cents wouldn't be

there if they hadn't excluded costs that are ordinary business expenses under GAAP
[Generally Accepted Accounting Principles]." Id.
104. See Robert Eli Rosen, "We're All Consultants Now": How Change in Client
Organizational Strategies Influences Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal

Services, 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 637, 663-64 (2002).
105. Id. at 665-66.
106. Id. at 666-67.
107. Id. at 672-75.
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Both were times of riches and decadence. Both were times in which there
was a sense of escape from old-fashioned rules. The new rules in Europe
were synthesized as a movement called modernism. The new rules among
the U.S. corporate elite were synthesized as the new information economy.
Both were times of social disintegration, the rise to political power of
heretofore marginalized groups, and culture wars. And both were times of
scandal. 1°8 If there is now a backlash against the immediate causes of our
fin de sikcle scandals, it may be temporary, as the underlying causes have
not changed.
Amidst unchanging larger patterns, however, SOX reforms have led to
intra-corporate political shifts. Three changes deserve mention. Auditors
have regained status and power. The CLO has been empowered in relation
to the CFO. 10 9 And legal departments have become powerful players in
compliance work. In addition, outside counsel have increased compliance
and governance work, 110 as well as an increased number of "independent"
internal investigations.
SOX section 404 internal controls requirements have led to the
resurgence of internal auditors. The internal audit function has also been
empowered by the increasing status of external auditors. The spin-off of
auditing from multidisciplinary practices has been well funded by the
responsibilities that the SEC has placed on the audit committee.
SOX made law a critical contingency for corporations. One survey of
corporate directors found that over eighty percent of directors believed that
SOX gave CLOs a great deal of responsibility to prevent future scandals. 1
This response rate in 2004 was thirty percent higher than that given in
2003.112
SOX led to the CLO being called on more and more in important
management decisions.' 13 The required certifications by the CFO and CEO
108. Compare Carl E. Schorske, Fin-De-Si~cle Vienna: Politics and Culture (1980), and
Eugen Weber, France, Fin de Sicle (Studies in Cultural History) (1986), with Joseph E.
Stiglitz, The Roaring Nineties: A New History of the World's Most Prosperous Decade
(2003).
109. "The legal star does appear to be on the rise at many corporations.... [G]overnance
and compliance duties have 'raised the general counsel to almost the same level (as) the
CFO,' says Thom Weatherford, a retired finance chief .. " Craig Schneider, You Have the
Right to an Attorney, CFO.com, Aug. 20, 2003, at 1 (on file with author). "[T]hese rules will
actually strengthen the relationship between the CEO and CFO and general counsel and
cause them to spend more time together," said a general counsel. Id. The competition
continues: After SOX, "CFOs already have begun recasting their role as 'corporate
watchdogs,' vouching for their firms' integrity." Zorn, supra note 100, at 363.
110. Workloads for Corporate Governance Attorneys Pile Up a Year After Sarbanes-

Oxley, Of Counsel, Sept. 2003, at 1.
111. Ass'n of Corp. Counsel, General Counsel as Risk Manager: Survey Results 2004, at
3 (2004), http://www.acca.com/Surveys/gc-risk.pdf [hereinafter Ass'n Corp. Counsel
Survey].
112. Id. at2.
113. Id. at 7 (stating that approximately 42% of corporate directors believed that their
general counsel have become more integrated in client business teams since SOX, while only
2.37% of surveyed directors believed that counsel had become less integrated). Not only
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led to the creation of financial disclosure review committees, in which
CLOs meet with CFOs and CEOs.' 1 4 Michael D. Fricklas, General Counsel
of Viacom, said the effect of SOX is that "I'm attending more meetings
than I used to. There's a highest-level closing meeting where the auditors
meet with the CEO. That traditionally wasn't a meeting that included
general counsel. Now I'm in those meetings." ' 1 5 Inside the corporation,
lawyers who used to report to the CFO now report to the CLO: "[T]his [is]
the moment for the legal department to gain absolute control over all legal
1
activities." 16
In making law a critical contingency, SOX led to the empowerment of
compliance officers. As a result of the scandals, "compliance officers are
being given far more responsibility and resources. 'This is a tremendous
sea change ....

Now, the compliance officer will report directly or

indirectly to the board of directors."'' 117 At other times, inside counsel
shunned the compliance role, fearing that being the "corporate conscience"
would exclude them from important decisions. 118 In the post-SOX
environment, compliance has become an essential element in important
corporate decisions. Susan Hackett, of the Association of Corporate
Counsel ("ACC"), advised inside counsel to "[t]ake advantage of the
passage of... Sarbanes-Oxley" and to "[u]se this opportunity to position
the legal department as a center of ...

initiatives."'1

9

institutionalizing .

.

. compliance

In response to the scandals, the ABA recommended that

SOX, but also the ABA's Cheek Report, are designed to improve corporate governance by
"elevating the role of the general counsel with respect to interaction with the board."
Michael W. Peregrine et al., 'Up the Ladder' Counsel Reporting Processes for the
Nonpublic/Nonprofit Corporation,Corp. Accountability Rep. (BNA), Apr. 16, 2004, at 423,

425; see also Cheek Report, supra note 14, at 32 (listing Recommendations 6, 7(a), and
7(b)).
114. See Foley & Lardner LLP, supra note 80, at 4-5 (quoting David Sherbin, General
Counsel and Secretary of Federal-Mogul corporation, discussing his company's financial
disclosure review committee); Martindale-Hubbell,

Protocols, Counsel to Counsel Connections,

Setting Standards . . . Creating

Summer 2003,

at 12,

available at

http://www.martindalehubbell.com/pdf/c2c/Connections_2003_Summer.pdf;

The

Roundtable, supra note 98, at 44 (comments of S. Arieh Zak, Vice President of Regulatory
Affairs and Corporate Counsel, Datascope Corp., and Thomas A. Gottschalk, Executive Vice
President of Law and Public Policy, General Motors Corp.).
115. The Roundtable, supra note 98, at 46.
116. Martindale-Hubbell, The SOX Effect:

Connections,

Summer

2003,

Specter and Reality, Counsel to Counsel

at

9,

10,

available

at

http://www.martindalehubbell.com/pdf/c2c/Connections_2003_Summer.pdf;
see also Ruth
V. Aguilera, Corporate Governance and Director Accountability:
An Institutional

ComparativePerspective, 16 Brit. J. Mgmt. S39, S45 (2005).
117. Steve Seidenberg, Compliance Alert: Companies Across Board Are Re-examining

Their Ethics Policies, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 26, 2002, at A14 (quoting Michael Hershman, a senior
executive at Decision Strategies).
118. Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and
OrganizationalRepresentation, 64 Ind. L.J. 479, 520-22 (1989).
119. Susan Hackett, Practical Steps for In-House Counsel After the New Attorney

Responsibility Standards, Corp. Governance Advisor, May/June 2003, at 22, 25; see also
GE: Governance Changes that Contribute to a Culture of Compliance, ACCA Docket, May

2003, at 20 (quoting Nell Minow).
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"[t]he general counsel of a public corporation should have primary
responsibility for assuring the implementation of an effective legal
' 120
compliance system under the oversight of the board of directors."
After SOX, "more ethics and compliance programs are being run by the
corporation's general counsel."' 12 1 It is increasingly a "common practice of
GCs [to] assume[e] the role of Compliance Officer."' 22 Risk managers are
increasingly reporting to the CLO.1 23 In one survey, 76.8% of CLOs
reported that they had initiatives underway "for better integration and
coordination with corporate risk management and other departments on risk
issues." 124 In 2003, a survey commissioned by the ACC found that risk
management reported to the general counsel in about one-third of the
companies surveyed, and that compliance reported to the general counsel in
25
more than two-thirds of the companies surveyed.
A large variety of compliance programs and initiatives emerged after
SOX. Not all of them involve lawyers, but many do. 126 For example, now
at 3Com, compliance is "decentralized," but at the center is the CLO. The
CLO issues quarterly reports to the board, the audit and finance committees,
and senior management on compliance. The CLO designs a "Matrix for Ad
Hoc Compliance Activities." To the CLO report the internal audit group,
the IP group, the safety, environmental, health and security group, the
corporate security investigations group, and the hotline group. 127
The intra-corporate power of inside counsel is buttressed by changes at
outside law firms. Not only are firms developing corporate governance
units, they also are designing compliance programs. 12 8 Law firms are
129
increasingly marketing their abilities to conduct internal investigations.
120. Cheek Report, supra note 14, at 32 (emphasis omitted).
121. Seidenberg, supra note 117, at A14. But see Terry Carter, Ethics Czars in Demand:
Self-Policing Requirements Result in New Positionsfor Experienced Lawyers, 90 A.B.A. J.

32 (2004) (observing that companies are moving compliance functions in and out of general
counsel's office).
122. Martindale-Hubbell, supra note 116, at 9; see also Bao Q. Tran & Jonathan P.
Tomes, Risk Analysis: Your Key to Compliance, ACCA Docket, Nov./Dec. 2003, at 38.
123. Maureen Milford, Insurance Worries: Post-9/1l, General Counsel Adopt Role of
CorporateRisk Managers,Nat'l L.J., Sept. 30, 2002, at A27.
124. Stephen E. Nowlan, Law Department Critical Success Factors: An Organizing

Principlefor Your Vision, Chief Legal Executive, Fall 2002, at 44, 52.
125. See Ass'n of Corp. Counsel, A Company's First General Counsel 9 (2004) (quoting
Altman Weil Inc. & Ass'n Corp. Counsel, The Law Department Management Benchmarks
Survey (2003)).
126. Am. Corp. Counsel Ass'n, Leading Practices in Codes of Business Conduct and
Ethics: What Companies Are Doing (2003) (on file with author).
127. Martindale-Hubbell,

Decentralized Compliance at 3Com:

The

Power of

Information, Communication, and Chargebacks, Counsel to Counsel Connections, Summer
2003,
at
13,
available
at
http://www.martindalehubbell.com/pdf/c2c/Connections 2003_Summer.pdf.
128. See Jenny B. Davis, Sarbanes Sells: Firms Create New Practice Units to Attract
Corporate Compliance Work, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2003, at 26.
129. See Leigh Jones, Call for Internal Probes Growing: Companies Seek Help from

Law Firms, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 22, 2004, at Al.

Clients are responding: "Golden West
[and] is saving those firms

Financial Corp .... deliberately avoids hiring top legal talent ...
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This, too, strengthens inside counsels' ability to obtain cooperation from
corporate management.
The goal of SOX may have been to shift "the de facto balance of power
between boards and management towards the de jure model of director
primacy."' 130 Direct indicators of this shift are difficult to detect. The rate
of diffusion of QLCCs, however, is an indirect indicator that the balance of
power has not shifted. So too may be the announcement that the ACC has
13 1
"join[ed] forces" with the National Association of Corporate Directors.
This alignment may reflect directors' gaining information, but it also might
indicate an additional avenue for co-opting directors.
Both developments, however, take place in the context of the altered
intra-corporate power of the CLO. SOX has achieved important results. It
was CFO dominance that helped contribute to the fin de sikcle scandals.
The observable effect of SOX has been to strengthen the CLO in relation to
the CFO.
It is in this context that the diffusion of QLCCs needs to be studied.
Having gained intra-corporate power because law is now a critical
contingency, CLOs may not feel it necessary or wise to allow for appeals to
the board through a QLCC. Power, however, is contestable and variable, so
that over time the need for a QLCC depends on the everyday relations
between the CLO and the CFO.
The SEC invited companies to name their extant audit committee as the
QLCC. 132 Seventy percent of the issuers that have formed QLCCs have
chosen to give their audit committees the QLCC's responsibilities and
powers. 133 A question that needs to be addressed is whether attorneys
reporting to an independent QLCC will constitute a more effective means of
constraining CFO power than that of attorneys reporting to an audit
committee serving as a QLCC. 134 Answering this question requires a study
for the day when special in-house investigations may be called for." Executives Say
Sarbanes-Oxley May Inspire Companies to Keep Top Lawyers in Reserve, 71 U.S.L.W. 2652
(2003).
130. Stephen M. Bainbridge & Christina J. Johnson, Managerialism, Legal Ethics, and

Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 299, 316 (emphasis omitted).
131. Frederick J. Krebs & Roger W. Raber, ACCA and NACD Join Forces to Benefit
You: Corporate GovernanceSurvey Results, ACCA Docket, Sept. 2003, at 90.

132. 17 C.F.R. § 205(2)(k) (2005).
133. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
134. The audit committee and the QLCC are never totally independent, as a QLCC
requires at least one member to be a member of the audit committee. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k)(1)
(2004). But nominating the audit committee as the QLCC may suggest that a company is
not asking the board "to address legal compliance matters that do not relate[] to financial or
disclosure issues .. " William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Views from the Bench:
The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System:

Preliminary

Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 953, 981 n.80 (2003).
At first glance, the information that may be provided to the QLCC is broader in scope than
that provided to the audit committee. While the audit committee must adopt procedures to
receive complaints "regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters,"
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301(4), 116 Stat. 745, 776 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C.S. § 78j-1 (LexisNexis 2005)), the QLCC may receive complaints of
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of issuers with QLCCs. Lacking such data, this Article turns next to
opposition to forming QLCCs in the first place.
II. RESISTANCES TO THE DIFFUSION OF QLCCs

A. Lawyers at the Coalface
A QLCC is a crisis management device. Those who resist its adoption
have portrayed the QLCC as a regularly used, highly active committee. In
reality, however, the QLCC is a fire alarm. When it is tripped, engines are
set in motion. But generally it remains untouched.
In filing after filing, companies report that "for the fiscal year ended ....
the Board's QLCC held no meetings."' 135 My research has only been able
to discover one company at which a QLCC has ever been called into
1 36
action.
That QLCCs are generally dormant is to be expected. A board may
choose to permit only attorneys to report to the QLCC. 137 Consequently,
any "material violation of an applicable United States federal or state securities law, a
material breach of a fiduciary duty arising under United States federal or state law, or a
similar material violation of any United States federal or state law," 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e). A
"breach of a fiduciary duty" refers to "any breach of a fiduciary or similar duty to the issuer
recognized under an applicable Federal or State statute or at common law, including but not
limited to misfeasance, nonfeasance, abdication of duty, abuse of trust, and approval of
unlawful transactions." 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(d). But the SEC has taken the position that
"information regarding misconduct involving illegality, undisclosed self-dealing, or conduct
otherwise bearing on managerial integrity" is presumptively material to investment
decisions. Manning Gilbert Warren III, Revenue Recognition and Corporate Counsel, 56
S.M.U. L. Rev. 885, 903 (2003); see also Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange
Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197, 1277-82 (1999)
(arguing that shareholders desire knowledge of a corporation's compliance behavior).
135. See, e.g., Forum Funds, Prospectus (Form 497), at 13 (Aug. 3, 2005), available at
http://www.secinfo.com/dl6T7q.zbp.htm; Potomac Funds, Prospectus (Form N-iA), at 20
(Aug. 2, 2005), available at http://www.secinfo.com/dR972.zlSx.htm; Harding, Loevner
Funds, Inc., Prospectus, Statement of Additional Information (Form N-1A), at 14 (Aug. 5,
2005),
available at http://www.secinfo.com/AF/www.secinfo.com_0000950156-05000307 001 0.rtf;
Monarch Funds, Statement of Additional Information (Form 497), at 9
(Mar. 11, 2005), availableat http://www.secinfo.com/d16T7q.z52.htm; Potomac Ins. Trust,
Prospectus, Statement of Additional Information (Form N-1A), at 21 (Apr. 9, 2004),
available at http://www.secinfo.com/drDcf.lA5.htm; Williamsburg Inv. Trust, Prospectus,
Statement of Additional Information (Form 497), at 15 (Aug. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.secinfo.com/dllTxp.z83.htm; see also Judith Bums, Is Sarbanes-Oxley
Working?, Wall St. J. Online, June 21, 2004, http://online.wsj.com (quoting a Delphi Corp.
representative as stating of Delphi's QLCC, "We have not yet had to call a meeting of it").
136. See infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text. That a QLCC is a crisis management
device, not expected to be much used, is supported by the large number of companies that
have named their already overburdened audit committee as their QLCC.
137. Under 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k)(2), a QLCC "adopt[s] written procedures for the
confidential receipt, retention, and consideration of any report of evidence of a material
violation under § 205.3." Section 205.3 refers only to attorneys, consequently, a QLCC is
free to adopt procedures that limit reporting duties to attorneys. Companies have so limited
their
QLCCs.
See,
e.g.,
Advo,
Inc.,
QLCC
Charter
1,
(2004)
http://www.advo.com/document/ADVO%20-%2OQualified%2OLegal%2OCompliance%20
Committee%20Charter,0.pdf ("The QLCC shall review any report by an attorney employed
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they are only roused 138
in the rare event that an attorney discovers evidence of
a

material violation.

[
In addition, the. Q Cc

ody

_lUCA

,wl.n

th at

attorney-caught between "going along to get along" and social or civic
responsibilities-does not negotiate a settlement with either management or
the CLO. 139 As all the parties have interests in continuing relations, only
unmanageable conflicts get to the QLCC.
Yet, QLCCs are described as causing multiple false alarms:
The unwary QLCC... might find itself the recipient of an overwhelming
number of reports (covering everything from trivial gripes to allegations
of entity-threatening frauds), all made by folks who would ... rather
report their concerns directly to the top than to a tip line ....
[A]
QLCC... could easily receive 20-50 complaints every year. 140

Employees generally are reluctant to report problems to their supervisors.
Their reasons range from the obvious economic ones to those relating to the
desire to maintain friendships. 14 1 SOX's mandate that lawyers report up the
ladder presumes that they, too, face economic and social pressures to "get
along." The QLCC is structured so that an attorney cannot report to it
without implying that the CLO and CEO are untrustworthy or involved in
noncompliance. 14 2 So why should lawyers be expected to overreport? The
above quotation's answer is that lawyers do not respect hierarchy and prefer
to speak "to the top." A QLCC will enable the expression of these
attitudes.

or retained by the Company or its subsidiaries."); Intermune, Inc., Compliance/Qualified
Legal Compliance Committee, Procedures for Reports of Material Violations, app. A, at 1,
http://www.intermune.com/pdf/charter-Compliance.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2005) (stating
that the QLCC will receive evidence of violations from "attorneys appearing and practicing
before" the SEC); Petroleum Development Corp., QLCC, Procedures for Confidential
Reporting, Retention and Consideration of Sarbanes-Oxley Act Sec. 307 Reports to the
QLCC 1, http://www.petd.com/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2005) (establishing a "direct dial
QLCC Hot Line" only for "[a]ttomeys employed or retained by the Company"). But see,
e.g., Zion Oil & Gas, Inc., Audit Committee Charter 6, QLCC Addendum, Authority,
http://www.zionoil.com/company/auditcharter.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2005) (stating that
the QLCC "is empowered to investigate any matter brought to its attention").
138. See Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Climbing "Up the Ladder": Corporate Counsel and
the SEC's Reporting Requirement for Lawyers, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 511, 511-12 (2004)
(describing "discovery by a lawyer of credible evidence of a material violation of law by the
issuer or its directors, officers or employees" as "an extraordinary event").
139. Karl Groskaufmanis, examining the incidence of reporting under Section 10A of the
Securities Exchange Act, discovered only twenty-nine reports of violations filed over nearly
an eight-year period. Id. at 521.
140. Letter from Board of Dirs., Am. Corp. Counsel Ass'n, to Jonathan Katz, Sec'y, SEC
(Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/accaO40703.htm
[hereinafter Apr. 7 Letter].
141. For a review of the literature on social reasons, see Frances J. Milliken et al., An
ExploratoryStudy of Employee Silence: Issues that Employees Don't Communicate Upward
and Why, 40 J. Mgmt. Studs. 6 (2003).
142. See infra notes 236-43 and accompanying text.
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Presuming that lawyers have antipathy to hierarchy and wish to challenge
their places in it is a comforting but unrealistic idyll. 14 3 In this prediction of
lawyer behavior, the QLCC is presented as disrupting the forces that lead
attorneys to be subservient to managerial choices, rather than independent.
These forces not only exist; attorneys also understand them to be legitimate.
Attorneys operate within an ideology of managerial power. The power of
corporations over their lawyers, as well as the personal ties and shared
orientations that develop between lawyers and corporate leaders, lead to
lawyers developing corporate perspectives. 144 Given these isomorphisms,
"it would seem unlikely that experienced lawyers with seasoned judgment
will regard this opportunity to bypass the CLO and report directly to a
board committee to be appealing, absent the rare case where the CLO is the
1 45
violator."
Several lawyers interviewed and others have suggested that QLCCs will
not spread until the SEC mandates "reporting out" or "noisy withdrawals."
As one lawyer said, "absent this requirement, there is no significant fear in
the corporate community that there will be lawyers voluntarily reporting out
their companies." Behind this prediction is the presumption that processes
currently exist to manage conflicts when lawyers gain evidence of material
violations. The introduction of QLCCs does not affect these processes.
Lawyers predict that, as a result of imposing whistle-blower obligations
on lawyers, clients will tell lawyers less, thereby undermining lawyers'
ability to act as gatekeepers. 146 This prediction is the knee-jerk response by
lawyers to any narrowing of the attorney-client privilege. When not
decrying the imposition of responsibilities on them, however, at least at one
conference, lawyers "generally dismissed the chilling effect on the
client/counsel relationship. The tension between being a business enabler
and a policeman has existed for years, and is familiar to any reputable
counsel."' 47 To presume that managers will withhold is to presume that
managers understand themselves as unjustified law breakers.
It 148
is
exceptional, not routine, for managers to so understand their actions.
And, in those situations, one assumes they have always been careful about
143. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction
Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System (1983).
144. See, e.g., Robert L. Nelson, Partners with Power 231-69 (1988).
145. Strauss, supra note 62, at 5.

of

146. See, e.g., Felix J. Bronstein, Note, The Lawyer as Director of the Corporate Client in

the Wake of Sarbanes-Oxley, 23 J.L. & Corn. 53, 64 n.85 (2003) (citing sources that discuss
the chilling effect that reporting-out and noisy withdrawal rules would have on attorneyclient communications); Fisch & Rosen, supra note 24, at 1130; Darlene M. Robertson &
Anthony A. Tortora, Reporting Requirements for Lawyers Under Sarbanes-Oxley: Has
Congress Really Changed Anything?, 16 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 785, 797 (2003); see also
Howard Stock, S-O's Lawyer Rule May Chill Information Flow, Investor Relations Bus.,

Aug. 18, 2003 ("[A] recent survey by the International Bar Association found that some 90%
of corporate lawyers expect the requirement to 'report up the ladder' any violations they
discover will cause executives to withhold vital information.").
147. Martindale-Hubbell, supra note 116, at 9.
148. See Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law 686 (1986).
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what they disclosed. Much more common is a managerial response that
whistle-blowing provisions of SOX have had no effect on
the client/counsel
49
relation or, if it has an effect, that that effect is positive.1
Those who resist QLCCs depict them as something other than fire
alarms. Jill Fisch and Kenneth Rosen compare the QLCC to an audit
committee. 150 The comparison is inapt. Regularly, financial reports need
approval by the audit committee. Audit committees have an increasingly
large number of tasks that must be performed on at least an annual basis.
By contrast, the QLCC has nothing to do until a report by an attorney is
made. 15 1 Professors Geoffrey Hazard and Edward Rock implicitly compare
a QLCC to a special litigation committee. This comparison is apt, as both
are crisis management devices. But as the focus of Hazard and Rock's52
argument is that the board needs on a continuing basis its own lawyer,'
this may leave the impression that QLCCs will produce work on a regular
basis.
The conception of QLCCs as routinely having work assumes that QLCCs
will have inappropriate work. Resisters to QLCCs presume that QLCCs
will involve the board in matters that could be handled at lower levels. The
QLCC's work, it is argued, is largely work that ought to be settled by
managers, including the CLO. For example, one lawyer interviewed said
that "every Tom, Dick and Harry will be calling a board committee [the
QLCC] directly... without that legal issue being properly vetted by
management and going up the chain." Another lawyer described going to
the QLCC as "the most serious response" a lawyer can make, and described
attorneys going to the QLCC as having "actually responded with a greater
magnitude than necessary." The same thought is also expressed in terms of
protecting the directors. The ACC objected to the ability of lawyers to
make reports directly to the QLCC, stating as follows:
Given the additional pressures that many directors face in the post-Enron
world, we believe that... [reserving] the time, resources and attention of
this board-level committee for those matters that either have been vetted
by the CLO or may involve inappropriate activity amongst the company's

149. See, e.g., Ass'n of Corp. Counsel Survey, supra note 11, at 6 (stating that less than
twelve percent of directors reported a chilling effect and, of those so reporting, only one in
five reported a negative effect for corporate governance).
150. Fisch & Rosen, supra note 24, at 1136, 1137 & n.152.
151. A QLCC would be better compared to the "monitoring board." "Even defenders of
the monitoring board acknowledge that monitoring is properly characterized as a safety
valve for crisis situations ....
The need to employ this safety valve is rare, however. Any
particular company confronts crisis with limited frequency." Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards
Seriously, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 265, 282 (1997).
152. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Edward B. Rock, A New Player in the Boardroom:
The Emergence of the Independent Directors' Counsel, 59 Bus. Law. 1389, 1389 (2004)
(predicting that, "with the additional legal requirement imposed on independent directors by
the Sarbanes Oxley Act and related changes to SEC rules and Stock Exchange listing
requirements, the independent directors, especially those on the Audit Committee, will begin
to be represented on a continuingbasis by independent legal counsel").
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top legal 153leaders ... [would be] an incredibly important service to
directors.

Reflecting the idea that resolving legal compliance issues is work that
should be done by management, not the board, various lawyers criticize the
intra-organizational effect of QLCCs. One lawyer concluded that a QLCC
would interfere with "reporting relationships." Another lawyer said that a
QLCC "clouds the organizational chart." Similarly, another described the
QLCC as "an additional level of board bureaucracy." A CLO put it
succinctly: "The QLCC will take a chunk out of my budget." Because the
QLCC is doing managerial work, resisters argue, its costs will be charged
back to management.
It is also argued that the inappropriateness of the board's involvement in
legal compliance is buttressed by the speed with which corporations are
now forced to file reports. Ironically, while attempting to ensure greater
board involvement in compliance, the SEC also "has shortened the
15 4
reporting deadlines for an issuer's quarterly and annual reports."
Involving the board through the adoption of QLCCs could delay the
transmittal of required filings, thereby "possibly diminishing the company's
155
market capitalization and endangering the issuer's exchange listing."
Sometimes, the argument that board involvement in compliance is
inappropriate is expressed by making puzzling predictions about behavior.
The repeated predictions that lawyers will become loose cannons and that
managers will become tight-lipped have already been discussed. The ACC
also predicted that outside counsel retained by a QLCC would act "like the
proverbial bull in the china shop."' 156 Why would such clumsy lawyers be
hired? Surely there are some corporate lawyers who are cognizant of the
intra-organizational effects of their involvement. One interviewed lawyer
predicted that the option of making a report to a QLCC would prevent
subordinates from engaging in conflict with superiors. This lawyer is
certainly correct that learning to engage in such conflict is necessary for an

153. Apr. 7 Letter, supra note 140.
154. Groskaufmanis, supra note 138, at 524 (citations omitted).
155. Id. Conversely, it has been argued that companies might want to form QLCCs
because
[aludit committees have significantly increased workloads as a result of SOX, and
might need the help, particularly on securities disclosure matters that are not
specifically related to finance. The recently adopted changes to Form 8-K require
companies to make current reports on a greater number of events, in a shorter
period of time, and contain a number of disclosure items that are not strictly
financial in nature.
Bruce F. Dravis, Law & Liability: The Attorney as CorporateDirector, NACD Directors
2005,
Mar.
Monthly,
http://www.downeybrand.conpublications/articles/050310_corpdirector.php.
156. Apr. 7 Letter, supra note 140. The American Corporate Counsel Association
("ACCA") suggested that outside counsel do not have sufficient "commitment to working
sensitively and productively with managers" and may in fact "inappropriately disrupt the
ongoing business of the organization, or permanently bum bridges." Id.
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organization, but he had no basis for his prediction. 157 Executives routinely
work with lawyers, jointly making decisions about compliance issues. But
the Business Roundtable predicts that directors, "even those with
independent legal advice, will not [be able] to make the legal judgments
158
required of a QLCC."'
There is also the prediction that a QLCC will overly rely on outside
consultants, failing to engage management and the knowledge they
possess. 159 This prediction presumes that directors will make decisions
lacking necessary information. The possibility that directors, concerned
about their own liability, would make decisions on grounds different than
the grounds on which executives would base their decisions is discussed in
the next section. Here, this prediction has been analyzed only for its
presumption that the board should not be involved in legal compliance
decisions because they would make them inappropriately.
Resistance to the QLCC may be understood as resistance to a monitoring
board. 160 Through the regulations adopted pursuant to SOX, the SEC
sought to "implement a 'judgmental monitoring model' of board
governance in which outside directors are expected to keep a sharply
skeptical eye on managers."' 16 1 The QLCC is one of these mechanisms, but
it is not required. It is not adopted because executives and directors have no
interest in adding a new monitor. Or as an interviewed lawyer quipped,
"the carrot" of the QLCC "isn't worth the stick."
On the other hand, a QLCC may be seen as a vehicle for the development
of a "deepening reciprocal sense of both personal and professional trust,
confidence and respect"' 62 between CLOs and the board. 163 A report to the

157. After considering the potential costs of a reporting attorney's going to the board, the
interviewed lawyer became less certain of his prediction, but he nonetheless said that the
presence of the option would defeat important intra-organizational reporting structures.
158. Letter from The Business Roundtable to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n
(Dec.
20,
2002),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/hamckinnell 1.htm.
159. See Apr. 7 Letter, supra note 140. The ACCA stated as follows:
In light of current events, boards are more likely than ever to forego additional
consultation with company executives and staff, including existing company
lawyers, in favor of retaining independent advisors to consult on virtually every
aspect of the company's governance and compliance agenda. While in many
cases, hiring outside advisors is most prudent, the practice has become almost
mandatory even when no suspicion of executive incompetence or malfeasance
exists: in today's climate, retaining outside advisors is considered necessary
"cover" for directors concerned with their own liabilities and possible hindsight
judgments made by shareholders and other stakeholders.
Id. at n.6.
160. Through SOX, "Congress quite clearly sought to force firms to adopt a different
model of corporate governance in which independent directors will intrusively monitor
managers." Hazard & Rock, supra note 152, at 1412.
161. Id. at 1396.
162. John Roberts et al., Beyond Agency Conceptions of the Work of the Non-Executive
Director: Creating Accountability in the Boardroom, 16 Brit. J. Mgmt. S5, S9 (2005)
[hereinafter Beyond Agency Conceptions] (quoting John Roberts & Philip Stiles, The
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QLCC threatens that trust. But it also provides an occasion for securing
that trust by enabling the CLO to strategize with and seek the counsel of
directors. The ACC suggested that the SEC needed to revise its model of
the QLCC "to promote a more cooperative and less adversarial relationship
between the QLCC and the CLO."'164 A "prerequisite for an effective
board" is a "culture of openness and constructive dialogue in an
environment of trust and mutual respect."'1666 5 In an effective board, a QLCC
would turn a crisis into a planning event.
Of course, the proper attitude of the QLCC to the CLO, whether it be
skeptical or trusting, depends on the case before it. 167 The relationship
between directors and managers needs to be both controlling and
depends on "constructive tension"
collaborative. 168 Board effectiveness
169
between the board and executives.
Relationship Between Chairmen and Chief Executives: Competitive or Complementary
Roles, 32 Long Range Plan. 36, 46 (1999)).
163. The Cheek Report notes that "there are situations in which separate counsel" hired
by the board "may be necessary or desirable," but that as a general practice using outside
counsel is not advisable because, "[a]part from the added cost of additional counsel, the
division of management and the board of directors into two separately counseled factions
may result in less open communication, less constructive collaboration ... and, ultimately,
less effective oversight by the board .... Cheek Report, supra note 14, at 24 n.54.
164. Apr. 7 Letter, supra note 140.
165. Derek Higgs, Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors 33
(2003), availableat http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/non exec-review/pdfs/higgsreport.pdf.
166. See Developments in the Law: Corporationsand Society, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2169,
2184-85 (2004) (distinguishing between "helping to guide the corporation's long-term
strategy" and "'[niegotiating' ... in an open (and, ideally, somewhat rigorous) negotiation
with management, serving as the nonconflicted representative of the company's interests").
167. See Beyond Agency Conceptions,supra note 162, at S8, S9, S18-S22; see also David
A. Nadler, Building Better Boards, Harv. Bus. Rev., May 2004, at 102. There is a debate in
the literature about the proper relationship of the board and management. All reject a
passive board. But some depict a proper board's relation to management as one of
skepticism, and others as that of defeasible trust. Those who support the skeptical board
point to the problems of faulty attribution, groupthink, and other cognitive biases that may
emerge through collaboration. Those who oppose the skeptical board point to the ill
consequences of distrust, which impede information flow, promote myopic behavior, and
degrade motivation. This debate is unproductive, as a board must sometimes adopt one
attitude over another. The problem that boards encounter is that they tend to get locked into
cycles that foster either control or collaboration. Chamu Sundaramurthy & Marianne Lewis,
Control and Collaboration: Paradoxes of Governance, 28 Acad. of Mgmt. Rev. 397, 399
(2003). Research ought to focus on mechanisms to break up these cycles. For a review of
the empirical literature attempting to measure corporate governance structures' effects on
performance, see M. Andrew Fields & Phyliss Y. Keys, The Emergence of Corporate
Governance from Wall St. to Main St.: Outside Directors, Board Diversity, Earnings
Management, and Managerial Incentives to Bear Risk, 38 Fin. Rev. 1 (2003); Benjamin
Hermalin & Michael Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined
Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, 9 Econ. Pol'y Rev. 7 (2003). These
studies produce no strong correlations, because financial performance will sometimes
require the board to be controlling and sometimes collaborative.
168. See, e.g., Sundaramurthy & Lewis, supra note 167; see also Donald C. Langevoort,
The Human Nature of CorporateBoards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences
of Independence andAccountability, 89 Geo. L.J. 797 (2001).
169. Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, supra note 64, at 1.
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The stakes in this "tension" are significant for CLOs and are only
increasing. An Altman Weil 2003 survey commissioned by the ACC found
that 39.2% of CLOs report directly to the Chairman of the Board. 170 CLOs
are told that developing "Trusting And Effective Working Relationships
With The Board Of Directors" is critical to their success. 171 One survey
found that one-third of directors responded that CLOs make regular reports
on legal or compliance activities to the board in executive session. 172
Although boards do not have the formal power to fire CLOs, 173 it is naive
for CLOs to ignore the importance of their favor.
Furthermore, the diffusion of QLCCs comes at a time when boards are
increasingly dependent on CLOs. The jurisdiction of the legal department
is increasing. As legal compliance is perceived to be more critical to the
organization, the board's need to both trust and monitor the CLO increases.
In this context, CLOs should have an interest in developing a nonadversarial QLCC. The board, too, should have an interest in forming a
QLCC that has a constructive working relationship with the CLO.
If the general counsel is trusted, but attorneys make more reports to a
QLCC than I predict or the evidence suggests, the board members on a
QLCC can nevertheless remain relatively inactive, except when the CLO is
charged. "If the board, and the members of a QLCC have confidence in the
judgment and independence of the general counsel's office," the general
counsel can have significant control over how a QLCC functions and much
of its work "can be delegated to the general counsel. ' 174 Except when the
legal department itself is involved, the QLCC's investigation "may [be
conducted] . . . by the chief legal officer." 175

The QLCC may involve

170. Ass'n of Corp. Counsel, supra note 125, at 9-10.
171. Nowlan, supra note 124, at 51.

172. Ass'n Corp. Counsel Survey, supra note 111, at 4.
173. David Boies suggests that the QLCC should have the responsibility to "supervise,
rotate and hire the general counsel." David Boies, Integrity in the CapitalMarkets, 28 Nova

L. Rev. 261, 275 (2004); see 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-l(m)(2) (West 2005) (giving the audit
committee power to fire the independent auditor). My colleague William Widen suggests
that, to enable their independence, CLOs should have golden parachutes.
174. Michael Tankersley, Implementing Attorney Ethics Policies in Law Firms and
Corporate Law Departments After Sarbanes-Oxley (Part 2 with Hypotheticals and Forms),

50 Pract. Law. 39, 44 (2004). Under these circumstances, the general counsel's office would
field initial reports, make initial determinations of the degree of response that is due, and
then confirm those judgments periodically with the responsible board committee. When
more serious and credible allegations are received, the charter would contemplate the
involvement of the QLCC on a more real-time basis.
175. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k)(3)(ii)(B) (2005); see Petroleum Develop. Corp. QLCC
Procedures 3(b), http://www.petd.com/ ("The QLCC may select internal counsel or engage
outside counsel ... to assist in the analysis and assessment of the report .... "). At Digimarc
Corp., which has a QLCC, "[b]ased on the nature of the suspected violation and the issue
raised," all reports of suspected violations are referred to the appropriate division of the
company or to "outside entities" for investigation. Digimarc Corp., Proxy Statement
(Schedule

14A),

at

E-11

(Apr.

1,

2004),

available

at

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089443/000104746904010291/0001047469-04010291.txt. Its Procedures for Reporting Suspected Noncompliance by Employees of
Digimarc Corporation states that employees are to go to the board only if their supervisor,
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inside counsel as active participants. 176 At least one corporation has made
the CLO the secretary of the QLCC. 177 Thus, QLCC action often can be
limited to the involvement of lawyers, without requiring involvement of the
directors.
A trusted CLO who seeks to maintain her own power has reason to be
proactive and work for the formation of a QLCC. Legal issues are already
in front of boards, and a significant number of boards already hire their own
lawyers, bypassing the legal department. 17 8 To prevent being bypassed
even more, legal departments need to know when legal issues arise. With
notice, it can be the CLO who brings outside counsel to address the
board. 179

A QLCC can be useful in bringing the CLO into the loop. In the absence
of an alleged breach by the CLO, the first thing that the QLCC will do is
"[t]o inform the issuer's chief legal officer ...of any report. ' 180 The CLO
then can influence how the QLCC proceeds. 18 1 As lawyers who wish to be
the CEO, or CLO "is involved in the suspected violation[s]." Id. at F-12. The company's
Code of Legal and Ethical Conduct says that "[c]ompany attorneys, under the explicit
direction of the Chief Legal Officer, are responsible for conducting, at the request of
management or on their own initiative, such audits and investigations as may be necessary
under this policy." Id. at F-4.
176. At Scientific Games Corp., the Compliance Committee serves as the QLCC. The
Compliance Committee's agenda
is determined by the Committee Chair in consultation with the VP-Chief Legal
Counsel, Compliance and VP-Security and Compliance ("Compliance
Officers").... While the Compliance Officers do not belong to the Committee,
they attend Committee meetings ... are responsible for preparing information...
and respond to questions ....The General Counsel or another company attorney
may serve as counsel to the Committee at the Committee's discretion.
Scientific Games Corp., Corporate Governance, Compliance Committee Charter,
http://www.scigames.comlsgcorp/compliance.asp (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
177. At Intermune, Inc., a Compliance/QLCC Committee was formed. Its charter states
that "[t]he Secretary of the Company shall be the Secretary of the Committee. The Secretary
shall keep minutes and records of all meetings of the Committee." Intermune, Inc., Charter
of the Compliance/Qualified Legal Compliance Committee of the Board of Directors (2004),
available at http://www.intermune.com/pdf/chartercompliance.pdf.
At Intermune, the
General Counsel is also the Corporate Secretary. See Intermune Inc., Executive Management
Team, http://www.intermune.com/wt/itmn/managementjteam (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
178. See Ass'n Corp. Counsel Survey, supra note 111, at 7 (stating that thirty percent of
directors reported that their boards or committees have done so).
179. Jeffrey Kindler, CLO of Pfizer, reported as follows:
I've been proactive about this .... I have found it helpful to bring outside
counsel into audit committee meetings when particularly important or difficult
issues are presented. They appreciate that, and I certainly appreciate it.... I don't
think it would be a good thing if the audit committee felt it needed regular outside
counsel representation .... if the committee got to the point where they asked for

that, it would probably indicate a problem.
The Roundtable, supra note 98, at 48.
180. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k)(3)(i).
181. Id. § 205.2(k)(3)(ii); see also Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct
for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6309 (Feb. 6, 2003) (final rule) ("Under this alternative,
the QLCC... would be responsible for carrying out the steps required by Section 307 of the
Act: notifying the CLO of the report of evidence of a material violation (except where such
notification would have been excused as futile under section 205.3(b)(4)).").
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heard by the board likely will be able to get a hearing, CLOs should prefer
that such a lawyer go to the QLCC so that the CLO will be apprised of the
problem.
CLOs also can use QLCCs to gain control over work. Johnson Controls
has instituted a system in which the legal department issues quarterly
reports about "anything that might trigger an investigation; or an
environmental concern, regardless of size or location." 182 Johnson
Control's general counsel explained that they tried to monitor "[a]nything
that potentially is a public relations issue. Even if it's small dollars, if it
could hit the press, we need to see it," and then it is reported. 183 These
reports are "vehicles for raising issues worldwide and getting them into the
system"I 84 -that is, for getting the issues under the control of the CLO.
Johnson Controls is the only company of which I am aware that has matters
pending before the QLCC. The CLO reports that there are "three 'up the
ladder' matters pending which have been referred to the company's
QLCC"; 185 that is, there are three matters where the CLO's authority is
being contested and the CLO has referred them to the QLCC.
A general counsel also can use a QLCC as a back stop. That a QLCC
exists is useful for a CLO when the CLO loses a political battle within
management. It is difficult for a CLO to attain and maintain the intracorporate power necessary to stop a pet project of senior management or a
project in which there have been substantial investments, or to demand that
186
the corporation make significant expenditures for legal compliance.
18
7
and CLOs have
Directors understand that such situations will occur,
gone to the board in such situations. 188 Being placed on the board's
agenda, however, entails further political battles and can itself be costly,
especially if the CEO doesn't want the board to get involved. 189 A CLO's
182. Foley & Lardner LLP, supra note 80, at 4 (quoting Jerome D. Okarma, General
Counsel, Johnson Controls, Inc.).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Robert Eli Rosen, Problem-Setting and Serving the Organizational Client: Legal
Diagnosisand ProfessionalIndependence, 56 U. Miami L. Rev. 179, 204-08 (2001).

187. In one survey, almost three-fourths of directors reported that the CLO should go to
the board, even without the concurrence of the CEO "[w]hen an allegation has not been
addressed by senior management after repeated attempts to get them to act." Ass'n Corp.
Counsel Survey, supra note 111, at 5.
188. "When asked whether they had ever been involved in a situation in which a general
counsel had taken a matter to the board without the consent of the CEO, 10 percent of
corporate directors and 17 percent of general counsel responded yes." Krebs & Raber, supra
note 131, at 95. "Of those who responded yes, 81 percent of corporate directors and 75
percent of general counsel say that bypassing the CEO resulted in the appropriate outcome."
Id.
189. One interviewed lawyer suggested that there is no need for a QLCC because "postEnron... it is inconceivable that a board committee would sit on a complaint [from a CLO]
and not act appropriately." If true, the presence of a QLCC can generate compliance even if
it is not used. Using the QLCC could be costly to a CLO: As one lawyer noted, "'How
many times can the general counsel go around the CEO and straight to the board with a
disclosure?' The answer is, 'Once. Because the CEO will fire you."' Lessons from Enron:
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ready access to a QLCC, even if not used, can be useful to CLOs in intracorporate warfare.
If the board trusts the CLO, QLCCs can be used to deepen that trust.
Trust is variable, but properly managed QLCCs benefit CLOs who have not
abused that trust. Yet CLOs oppose their adoption. Are so few CLOs
trusted by their boards?
CLOs who have the board's trust can benefit from the adoption of
QLCCs, but nevertheless do not support them. In an interview, one said
simply, "I'd resign if they created a QLCC." That CLO explained that,
even though he was trusted, the adoption of a QLCC would show that he
was not trusted. Another put it this way: "It's my job to convince
management to do the right thing. That's what I get paid for and if I can't
do it then I should focus on taking a position in a different company."
The adoption of QLCCs challenges that CLOs "get paid for" making the
difficult and messy legal compliance decisions. Both inside and outside
counsel understand that the CLO makes and assumes responsibility for
legal compliance decisions. The job of the CLO is "to handle the most
sensitive issues of legal compliance the company faces." 190 QLCCs are
inappropriate because "both management and directors ... believe that
investigating the reports and developing a response should, in most
instances, be the responsibility of management."'1 9 1 In fact, "most in-house
lawyers have spent significant amounts of time and energy encouraging the
board to trust them to handle [inside the legal department] these issues." 1 9 2
As one outside counsel interviewed reported, "It is the job of the general
counsel to stand there at the coalface. That's not a job for the board. A
general counsel who lets the board create a QLCC doesn't deserve the
money he's being paid." Standing at the coalface, the CLO is at the cutting
edge. Standing at the coalface, the CLO gets dirty.
The resistance to QLCCs derives from understandings that the board is
an illegitimate forum for cutting legal coal. Directors are not understood to
be part of the "systems of jobs" through which legal compliance decisions
are made. It is true and explanatory that a QLCC poses "an out-group
threat, to be resisted and circumvented as inconsistent with group solidarity
and the primary mission of the business as understood" by the
executives. 1 9 3 But characterizing QLCCs as a threat mischaracterizes the
lawyers' points of view. Why, when a QLCC can give lawyers greater
access to the board and support lawyers in conflicts with management, do
A Symposium on Corporate Governance, 54 Mercer L. Rev. 683, 720 (2003) (comment of
William Ide).
190. Linda Madrid, US Counsel Come to Grips with Reporting Rule Confusion, 23 Int'l
Fin. L. Rev. 39, 40-41 (2004).
191. Broc Romanek & Kenneth B. Winer, The New Sarbanes-Oxley Attorney
Responsibility Standards, ACCA Docket, May 2003, at 40, 54.
192. Foley & Lardner LLP, supra note 80, at 8 (quoting Susan Hackett, General Counsel,
Association of Corporate Counsel).
193. Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering:
Beliefs, Biases and OrganizationalBehavior, 63 Brook. L. Rev. 629, 673 (1997).
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lawyers not want to take advantage of this out-group threat to the
executives with whom they work?
Lawyers, both inside and outside counsel, do not want the power QLCCs
might afford them because board involvement in legal compliance decisions
is inappropriate given that the CLO has assumed responsibility for these
decisions. As the ACC put it, what a QLCC does is "to 'absolve' the
company's lawyers of responsibility."' 194 Susan Hackett explains that many
CLOs did not present the possibility of forming a QLCC to the board
because they "were not comfortable telling the directors to 'Remove me
from responsibility."' 195 Standing at the coalface is the job of the CLO. If
it requires absolution, the CLO must resolve this personally. The CLO is
the "fall guy" when things go wrong. In other words, the CLO is the vice196
president in charge of going to jail.
The ACC advises newly appointed CLOs that they must "Be Willing to
Assume Risk."'197 A CLO "not only gives legal advice but also shares in
the management responsibility for decisions. Such willingness to assume
reasonable risks establishes the lawyer as part of the business team and not
simply as a legal consultant."1 98 Consequently, what is observed is that "inhouse counsel often sought out opportunities to act as principal: leading
corporate transactions, making business judgments, and taking on expanded
199
corporate responsibilities."'
It is essential for lawyers that there be "ways of achieving a modus
vivendi with their employing organization which prevents them from
experiencing high and intolerably stressful levels" of conflict between their
professional and organizational selves. 20 0 For both inside and outside
counsel, placing the CLO at the coalface manages this conflict.
Compliance decisions are inappropriate for the board because, although
they are business decisions, they also are professional judgments, and they
also are personal choices. The CLO has vested his or her integrity in these
decisions. 20 1 Of course, all hope that the CLO's stake will not have to be
cashed out.
The lack of diffusion of QLCCs demonstrates a source of resistance that
is not captured by agency cost analysis. Agency cost theorizes an agent
playing a role in which the agent may use the role's authority for the
194. Romanek & Winer, supra note 191, 54 app. (ACCA'S Practical Tips for Dealing
with the New Attorney Responsibility Standards Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Tip #3).
This question is also asked in Hackett, supra note 119, at 24.
195. Foley & Lardner LLP, supra note 80, at 8.
196. Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes 21 (1986).
197. Ass'n of Corp. Counsel, supra note 125, at 20.
198. Id.
199. Randy S. Segal & Richard K.A. Becker, Through the Looking Glass: Ten Lessons

from In-House Counsel on Trial, ACC Docket, May 2004, at 23, 36.
200. Hugh P. Gunz & Sally P. Gunz, The Lawyers' Response to Organizational
Professional Conflict: An Empirical Study of the Ethical Decision Making of In-House

Counsel, 39 Am. Bus. L.J. 241, 279 (2002).
201. For a discussion of the important role that integrity plays in executive decisionmaking, see Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of Executive (1968).
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agent's own interests. In regards to QLCCs, agency cost analysis would
suggest that CLOs may cheat (by not informing boards of the option of
QLCC adoption in order to maintain the CLO's power or to protect top
management law breakers) 202 or shirk (by counseling boards to adopt
QLCCs to enable the CLO to foist problems away from him and onto the
board). 2 03 The resistance described here also derives from the legitimate
authority the agents possess. But it does not derive from agents playing a
role separate from their self understandings and interests.
Rather than a disenchanted, organizational cage, the ideology of
managerialism represents a triumph of spirit over calculative rationality.
An organization is not simply a production system, it is also a social system
that is shaped by an environment which in turn shapes the organization. As
a consequence, corporate hierarchies contain within themselves "[r]omantic
fictions of personal fulfillment, development, and growth. ' '20 4 The
corporation may be a nexus of contracts. But some of these contracts are
symbolic.20 5 Corporations are run by committed professionals who demand
control "as an outcome of [professional] identity rather than an effect of the
pure motivating power of instrumental and hedonistic sources of
gratification... feelings of personal worth and identity become closely tied
to the indications proved by these systems. ' 206
The ideology of
managerialism is a form of governmentality. It is imbedded in a web of
routine practices and understandings that go unnoticed. It allows corporate
agents to construct themselves by providing motives, constraints, and
satisfactions.
Legal compliance decisions require selecting options and attendant risks.
Identifying legal risks requires understanding "Who is potentially affected
by what the business does? Who are the stakeholders? What are the
potential risk areas in respect of each of those parties?" 20 7 Needing to reach
202. The CLO's deliberate failure to counsel use of the QLCC constitutes "cheating the
corporation," of course, only if it is assumed that on balance the QLCC operates to the
corporation's benefit.
203. According to this agency cost analysis, the observed lack of diffusion of QLCCs
would suggest that CLOs are more ambitious-seeking to attain and maintain power-than
anxious-worried about the effects of resolving problems themselves.
204. Robert Dingwall & Kerry Kidd, After the Fall... : Capitulatingto the Routine in

Professional Work, 108 Penn St. L. Rev. 67, 84 (2003).
205. See Langevoort, supra note 32, at 1193. Langevoort writes as follows:
[A] divide exists-though many contemporary theorists are working to bridge itabout whether it makes sense to think about the firm as a complex connection of
people and contracts or whether we should go a step further and acknowledge that
organizations take on an internal life of their own, separate and distinct from the
individuals who work there at any given time. If so, then norms and culture
matter, too, perhaps sufficiently to substitute for strong legal controls with respect
to some kinds of incentives.
Id.

206. Id.
207. Caron Murphy, Balancing the Risks, European Counsel, June/July 2002, at 63, 66.
From a company perspective, by contrast, it may be said that legal risks are managed by
avoiding, assuming, controlling, reducing, transferring, and/or mitigating them.
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compromises between the different stakeholders, legal managers define
who and what is the client. To them, legal compliance decisions are made
by moral analysis. But it is a particular form of moral analysis. It is one
tied to the virtue of the CLO.
In selecting options and choosing risks, executives perceive their
20 8
interests as textured by those of the corporation's stakeholders.
Management, not the board, is the nexus of contacts between the
corporation and regulators, creditors, employees, public interest
organizations, and other stakeholders. Management, not the board of
directors, perceives itself as the "mediating hierarch" between the
company's stakeholders. 20 9 The diffusion of QLCCs reveals that, at least
are unlikely to use the board to
for legal compliance decisions, 2executives
10
issues.
difficult
'upstairs"'
"kick
When lawyers also wear management hats, they become personally liable
for breaches of fiduciary obligations to the corporation. "In-house lawyers
are only effective if they are integrated and trusted members of corporate
executive, strategic and compliance management teams," 2 11 says the
President of the ACC. Hence, they are treated as principals. Post-SOX,
more inside counsel are becoming compliance officers or leaders of a
compliance management group. These jobs are understood by regulators to
be business related, not legal. 2 12 In the ideology of managerialism, they are
understood as other ways to incur personal risk.
The recent SEC action against the general counsel of Electro Scientific
Industries, Inc., depicts this shift in understanding of the role of the CLO.
The general counsel was "not involved, present, or consulted" when the
CFO made the noncompliance decision. 2 13 The CLO allowed the CFO,
who was to be promoted to CEO, to cut him off at an audit committee
meeting. 21 4 As a result, the committee was not presented with information
contained in a memorandum that revealed noncompliance, and was material
to the corporation's 10-Q filing.215
The complaint alleged the general counsel's "failure to fulfill his
gatekeeper role." 216 The complaint alleged that he had a duty to inform the
208. See J.H. Davis et al., Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management, 22 Acad.

Mgmt. Rev. 20 (1997) (developing an account of management-board interaction based on
this premise).
209. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of CorporateLaw,
85 Va. L. Rev. 247, 250 (1999) (describing the board as the "mediating hierarch").
210. Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why
Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 667, 687

(2003) (arguing, instead, that executives bargain in the shadow of board decision and let the
board resolve difficult conflicts among stakeholders).
211. Madrid, supra note 190, at 41.
212. See Ass'n of Corp. Counsel, New to In-house Practice 31-32 (2004).
213. Complaint at 3, SEC v. Isselmann, No. 3:04-CV-01350 (D. Or. Sept. 21, 2004),
availableat http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18896b.pdf.
214. Id. at 5.
215. Id. at 4.
216. Id. at 1.
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board which he breached. 2 17 The case settled on a different theory. The
general counsel accepted personal liability for making a corporate decision
because he "decided" not to pursue matters with the board. 2 18
The SEC continued this approach when investigating Google's general
counsel, David Drummond. Before its initial public offering ("IPO"),
Google granted options to its employees. "By failing to inform the board
that there was a legal issue as to whether registration of the stock options
granted to employees was required, Drummond took responsibility for the
decision," SEC enforcement officials are reported to have said. 2 19 "'Instead
of going to the board with the issue about registration [of the stock options],
he simply made the decision on his own... [Drummond] was a lawyer who
2 20
became a client."'
"Managerialism as an ideology" needs to be distinguished from other
uses of "managerialism" in the legal literature. Some have challenged
director primacy as a normative theory of corporate organization, arguing
that law should embrace managerialism. 22 1 Managerialism as an ideology
means that managerialism is normative for managers. From a manager's
point of view, manager primacy is desirable.
The ideology of
managerialism does not argue, however, that the law ought to embrace the
manager's point of view. Others have described corporate behavior as
managerialist. 222 Those authors have typically understood managerialism
as power, often used for self-serving ends. 22 3 Managerialism as an
ideology emphasizes that corporate behavior is to be understood, not only
as deriving from power or interest, but also from the normative conceptions
of corporate actors. 2 24 Managerialism as an ideology treats seriously
managers' accounts of responsibility.

217. Id. at 6.
218. Pamela Atkins, SEC Enforcement Chiefs Warn Lawyers About Risks of Going
Beyond Advisory Role, Corp. Accountability Rep. (BNA), Jan. 28, 2005, at 74, 74-75.

219. Id. at 75.
220. Id. (quoting a SEC official).
221. See, e.g., Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom CorporateManagersAre Trustees: A Note,
45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1932); see also William W. Bratton, Jr., The New
Economic Theory of the Firm: CriticalPerspectives from History, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1471
(1989); Allen Kaufman & Lawrence Zacharias, From Trust to Contract: The Legal

Language of ManagerialIdeology, 1920-1980, 66 Bus. Hist. Rev. 523 (1992).
222. See, e.g., Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured

Board-The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. Rev. 127 (1996).
223. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 317-22 (1985)
(discussing managerial discretion); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of
Historyfor CorporateLaw, 89 Geo. L.J. 439, 444 (2001) (same).
224. See Mark J.Roe, The Institutions of Corporate Governance 12-13 (Harvard John M.

Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 488, 2004), available at
http:www.law.Harvard.edu/programs/olin-center. Roe writes,
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Managerialism is not unproblematic. Managerial decisions sometimes
need review, because managers may be on the wrong tack. Psychological
biases, like "path-dependence," may prevent course adjustments. 225 The
board can provide useful strategies and assessments. Managerialism as an
ideology challenges none of these arguments. It is an account of individual
responsibility, not one of solitary decision making.
B. Directorsat the Coalface?
Corporations must publicly assert their commitments to obey the law.
SOX requires corporations to promulgate codes of ethics which must
mandate "compliance with applicable governmental rules and
regulations." 226 The NYSE requires companies to have codes of ethics that
mandate "compliance with laws, rules and regulations," 227 and the National
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation ("NASDAQ")
requires its listed companies to have codes of ethics which require that
"'illegal action must be dealt with swiftly and the violators reported to the
appropriate authorities."' 228
The codes of ethics that corporations
promulgate normally are unflinching in demanding legal compliance. A not
atypical formulation is, "Obeying the law, both in letter and in spirit, is the
229
foundation of this Code."

Managers do not act solely for remuneration, but also for the satisfaction of
doing a good job. And "doing a good job" is defined by circumstance,
psychology, and culture.... These notions of norms and professionalism are softer
and less well understood than the other institutions, but that doesn't mean that
they're absent, or that they're unimportant.
Id.
225. Langevoort, supra note 168, at 826.
226. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 406, 116 Stat. 745, 789-90 (to
be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7264); see also William A Hancock, Drafting Codes of Legal and

Ethical Conduct, 20 Corp. Counsel Q. 16, 17 (2004); Marie McKendall et al., Ethical
Compliance Programs and Corporate Illegality: Testing the Assumptions of the Corporate

Sentencing Guidelines, 37 J. Bus. Ethics 367 (2002) (finding no relation between ethics
codes or compliance programs and decreased Occupational Safety and Health
Administration violations).
227. Final NYSE Corporate Governance Rules 16 (2003), available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf [hereinafter NYSE Rules]. The rules also
ask the company to "[el ncourage[e] the reporting of any illegal or unethical behavior." Id.
228. NASDAQ,
Inc.,
Rule
4350
(n)
(2005),
available
at,
http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/display.html?rbid=l 189&elementid=1 159001482.
229. Rigel Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Code of Conduct, http://www.rigel.comlrigel/code (last
visited Oct. 31, 2005). Other codes are more explicit in separating out employee and

corporate responsibilities for compliance:
Each employee has an obligation to comply with the laws of the cities, states
and countries in which Cell Genesys operates. We will not tolerate any activity
that violates any laws, rules or regulations applicable to Cell Genesys ....
You are
expected to understand and comply with all laws, rules and regulations that apply
to your job position.
Cell Genesys, Code of Business Conduct and Ethics--Corporate Governance,
http://www.cellgenesys.com/investing-business-conduct.shtml (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
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NYSE regulations require that a listed company's audit committee's
charter address how the committee "assist[s] board oversight of ...

the

company's compliance with legal and regulatory requirements." 230 As the
Sherman & Stearling survey found, "[t]he audit committees of 60 of the
Top 100 companies have attempted to limit the scope of this responsibility.
. .,,231
"
They have attempted to limit the scope of the issues that audit
committees will consider. They also have attempted to limit the reports that
audit committees receive about compliance. 2 32 Fifteen of the Top 100
companies include in their audit committee's charter exculpatory language
to the effect that it is "[n]ot [the] audit committee's responsibility to ensure
233
compliance with laws."

The board's aversion to oversight of legal compliance is not limited to
resistance to QLCCs. Lawyers who have been rewriting audit committee
charters to exclude liability for legal compliance may feel it inappropriate to
propose to the board the formation of a QLCC.
The NYSE listing requirements also require audit committees to "discuss
policies with respect to risk assessment and risk management. '234 The
NYSE commentary to this rule elaborates that "it is the job of the CEO and
senior management [i.e., not the board] to assess and manage the
company's exposure to risk. '235 With respect to risk management, unlike
legal compliance, the audit committee does not have to demonstrate how its
oversight assists in reducing undesirable corporate behavior.
Nevertheless, some boards and lawyers who work for boards seek
clarification of this discussion requirement. What must be discussed?
According to the Rules, "the [audit] committee must discuss guidelines and
policies to govern the process by which risk assessment and management is
undertaken." 236 Some lawyers and boards worry that this creates too much
230. NYSE Rules, supra note 227, at 10.
231. Shearman & Sterling LLP, supra note 43, at 20.
232. Id. The Shearman & Sterling Survey reported that fifty-one companies limited the
scope of their compliance reports to "[d]iscuss[ion] [of] legal issues with material or
significant impact on company or its financial statements"; twenty-eight companies limited
the scope to "[d]iscuss[ion] [of] correspondence or report that raises issues that may have
significant impact on company's financial statements"; ten companies limited the scope to
"[r]eview [of] significant litigation and related issues including risk"; and one company
limited the scope to "[r]eview[ing] and discuss[ing] reports from General Counsel about
legal issues determined by General Counsel to merit attention [by the] committee." Id.
233. Id.
234. NYSE Rules, supra note 227, at 11.
235. Id. at 12.
236. Id. Susan Bies, Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, has clarified board
responsibilities as follows:
Directors ... have the responsibility to set the tone regarding their corporations'
risk-taking and to oversee the internal control processes so that they can
reasonably expect that their directives will be followed ....
Internal controls are
the responsibility of line management. Line managers must determine the level of
risks they need to accept to run their businesses and to assure themselves that the
combination of earnings, capital, and internal controls is sufficient to compensate
for the risk exposures. Supporting functions such as accounting, internal audit,
risk management, credit review, compliance and legal should independently
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risk of liability. One company states in its audit committee charter that "it
to determine the
is the responsibility of the CEO and senior management
237
appropriate level of the Company's exposure to risk."
Discussion of risk management entails discussion of how much risk is
being hedged and how much is outstanding. That choice, as the above
charter clarifies, is management's. Discussion of legal compliance also
entails discussion of how noncompliance is being hedged and how much is
outstanding. That choice, however, cannot be publicly admitted. Publicly,
compliance. This is a dilemma a
corporations are committed to complete
238
QLCC.
a
adopting
in
board faces
239
A QLCC is a one-sided ratchet. Except when it is used by the CLO,
the QLCC will only be activated when the CLO approves of an action that
an attorney reasonably believes is a violation. As the General Counsel to
the ACC has observed,
In a practical world, I do not know of a single general counsel who
honestly believes that they would report [their conclusion that the
company is violating the law] up the ladder of their management, and
even beyond their management to the board, and that any board in the
Western world at this point would say to them, "We choose not to take
have an SEC investigation triggered." It's just
your advice, we'd rather
240
never going to happen.

There are three situations in which a CLO may approve an action that a
lawyer believes is a violation. First, there may be situations in which there
is actual legal or factual disagreement. Few of these situations are likely to
reach a QLCC because they are manageable. An independent attorney, for
example, can issue a report that will prompt the reporting attorney to step

monitor the control process to ensure that they are effective and that the risks are
measured appropriately.
Susan S. Bies, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at Fordham University School of Law
Annual International Symposium on Derivatives and Risk Management (Oct. 8, 2002) (on
file with author).
237. Callidus Software, Inc., Audit Committee and Qualified Legal Compliance
Committee Charter 7 (as amended and restated on March

18, 2005), available at

http://www.callidussoftware.com/callidus/investor-relations/governance/2005.03.18Callidus-Audit-Committee-Charter.pdf.
238. Executives may point, not to corporate choice, but to the complexity of regulation as
creating the dilemma. This argument has some merit: "[A]t least in some complex
regulatory situations ... it may not be possible to know for certain that one's business is in
compliance or fully in compliance ....[o]r it sometimes occurs.., that complying with one
...regulation actually conflicts with complying with another." Eric W. Orts, The Complexity
and Legitimacy of CorporateLaw, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1565, 1603 n.196 (1993).

239. See supra notes 174-89 and accompanying text.
240. Symposium, The Evolving Legal and Ethical Role of the Corporate Attorney After
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Panel Three: Ethical Dilemmas Associated with the
Corporate Attorney's New Role, 52 Am. U. L. Rev. 655, 667 (2003) (remarks of Susan

Hackett, Senior Vice-President and General Counsel, American Corporate Counsel
Association).
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down. 24 1 Second, there are situations in which the CLO is "in" on the
deal. 242 These are precisely the situations for which QLCCs are designed,
especially if it is not only the CLO but also other executives who are "in"
on the deal. And, third, there are situations in which a CLO approves an
action, not because of improper benefits flowing to the CLO, but because 2of
43
the CLO's decisions about the corporation's overall legal risk portfolio.
"[T]he GC must be adept at risk management," balancing "the CEO's game
plan," the business's "competitive realities," "the needs and objectives of
the local management team," and the "murkiness of the law." 244 As Caron
the
Murphy notes, "[A] balance must be struck between legal perfection 24and
5
realistic."
be
to
is
key
The
business....
the
of
demands
commercial
From the outside, the third situation may look like the second, because
the CLO is accepting the risk of noncompliance and is being well paid by
the company. Consequently, the reporting attorney may be unwilling to
step down. But in the third situation, the CLO and the reporting attorney
are battling about the corporation's tolerance of legal risk. They have
different perspectives: The CLO is looking at the portfolio, the reporting
attorney at the instant case. The SEC prevented easy resolution of this
conflict when it decided to deny that the CLO's determination-even when
of reasonableness"-is dispositive
the CLO's determination is "in the range
246
of an attorney's reporting obligations.
241. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(3)(ii), (b)(8) (2005). The regulations allow a lawyer to step
down when the board is advised that the CLO has hired an attorney who has determined that
there is a "colorable defense" regarding the violation. Id. § 205.3(b)(6)(B)(ii). The fear of
lawyers as loose cannons may stem from this language. Having raised the issue, will a
lawyer who receives such a letter step down? Not likely. In reality, however, lawyers do not
write such letters. If they did, any sophisticated reader would know that the letter refers to
what is almost certainly a violation. For a lawyer who receives such a letter, the situation
switches from the first type described in the text to the third type.
242. An attorney may go directly to the QLCC when the "attorney reasonably believes
that it would be futile to report evidence of a material violation to the issuer's chief legal
officer." Id. § 205.3(b)(4).
243. "[T]he scope of that risk, its wider consequences for the company, the relationship
between that risk and others, and the aggregate risk being assumed by the company often are
matters that only the General Counsel is in a position to assess in their entirety." Stephen J.
Friedman & C. Evan Stewart, The Corporate Executive's Guide to the Role of the General
Counsel 2 (2000), quoted in Beardslee, supra note 100, at 32 n.104.
244. Bob Major & Andrew Pringle, Ascending to the Top-The Road to Becoming a
General Counsel (2003), availableat http://www.mhaglobal.com/articles/Article31 .htm.
245. Murphy, supra note 207, at 65.
246. In response to the rules, the ABA informed the SEC that "[wie believe it is important
that the Commission recognize that a reporting attorney may rely on the considered
judgment of the CLO so long as that judgment is in the range of reasonableness even though
the attorney would not necessarily come out that way." Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6299 n.19 (Feb. 6, 2003) (final rule).
The SEC rejected this argument:
While some commentators suggested that a reporting attorney should be able to
rely completely on the assurance of the issuer's CLO ... the Commission believes
that this information, while certainly relevant to the determination whether an
attorney could reasonably believe that a response was appropriate, cannot be
dispositive of the issue.
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QLCCs engage a risk-averseness differential between (a) lawyers or
directors considering a particular risk, and (b) inside counsel-in difficult
cases typically the CLO-deciding about the shape of the issuer's portfolio
of legal risks. An issuer makes multiple decisions containing legal risks.
Companies develop cultures regarding the assumption of legal risks.
Lawyers engage those cultures, sometimes resisting their crystallizations.
Ultimately, CLOs make decisions about the kind and degree of legal risks
the issuer will take in any given situation. 247 They make such decisions in
the context of engagements with multiple stakeholders and in light of the
issuer's culture and portfolio of legal risks. For each legal compliance
decision, the CLO's level of risk acceptance is determined by the issuer's
various undertakings and stakeholders. In regards to a report made to a
QLCC, a reporting attorney's or a director's level of risk acceptance will be
determined from a perspective emergent from the particular report.
Normally, this risk-averseness differential is managed. The ideology of
managerialism, which presumes that executives, including CLOs, make
risk-bearing decisions, makes these disputes mostly manageable. When
there is a risk that someone will go to jail, these disputes also are mostly
manageable. Although a CLO may be the "VP in Charge of Going to Jail,"
this is not a prospect that CLOs seek. The prospect that even the best laid
cover-ups may be discovered will mostly make CLOs avoid actions that can
land someone in jail. But sometimes there is a crisis, and a dispute between
lawyers, or between lawyers and executives, cannot be contained. In a
crisis, a QLCC may be roused from its dormancy.
A QLCC is asked to examine the CLO's level of acceptable risk taking
regarding a single violation. A QLCC requires directors to decide an
appropriate level at which to accept noncompliance. And although they
may rely on an opinion that there is a "colorable defense" for the action,
directors are reluctant to do so transparently. Directors face a fundamental
ambiguity in having responsibility for "legal compliance," while facing the
reality that their company accepts at least the risk of noncompliance.
QLCCs make transparent that corporations take legal risks. Yet corporate
legitimacy demands preventing noncompliance. From the perspective of
directors, all involvements in legal compliance, and QLCCs in particular,

Id. at 6300.
247. Describing the process as one of the CLOs saying "we can take this much risk here
and this much there" is a descriptive, but not necessarily accurate, depiction of the decision
process. Corporations take action after considering the available options. It is only after
such consideration that corporations determine acceptable risks. Professor Baruch Fischhoff
et al. describe the limitations of the phrase "acceptable risk" as follows:
Although the phrase acceptable risk is useful for describing a kind of decisionmaking process, it is not appropriate for describing the results of that process. The
risk associated with the most acceptable option is not acceptable in any absolute
sense. One accepts options, not risks, which are only one feature of options.
Moreover, even the choice of an option is highly contingent on how the problem is
defined, what other options are available, and who is doing the deciding.
Baruch Fischhoff et al., Acceptable Risk 139 (1981).
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"create the potential for expanded board liability and increased intervention
'248
by the courts into corporate affairs.
Risk taking is a normal part of corporate action. 249 A central character,
the entrepreneur, is quite simply a risk taker. 250 Corporate governance
strives to sustain risk taking, as in the business judgment rule. Agents
present risks of opportunistic behavior, whose costs can be minimized, but
never eliminated. As William H. Simon has noted, "'Risk management' is
a key function in the self-conscious bureaucracy. Managers are expected to
identify risks, formulate strategies for limiting them, and update the
25 1
strategies in the light of experience.
It is normal for businesspeople to understand that "law is simply a source
of 'risk' to the business firm; it is the lawyers' task to assess it and, to the
extent possible, reduce it."' 252 This is not to say that businesspeople take the
"bad man's" view of legal rules. 2 53 To say that noncompliance is normal is
not to say that corporations violate the rules whenever it is in their interest
to do so. In fact, corporations may be much more compliant than one
would think if one took the "bad man" perspective on corporate action.
Corporations do have institutionalized commitments to compliance, such as
in quality control departments. Corporations do want to be good corporate
citizens. There are, in short, cultures of compliance that exert pressures
upon corporate actors. Nonetheless, "[e]vidence abounds that regulatory
violations by business firms are far from infrequent." 254 Despite corporate
good intentions,
[c]ompanies cannot establish a general culture and belief system that
emphasizes aggressiveness, risk-taking and limit-testing for general
competitive purposes without running the risk that those same attitudes
248. Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency,

76 N.C. L. Rev. 1265, 1303-04 (1998).
249. See Thomas L. Barton et al., Making Enterprise Risk Management Pay Off 5 (2002)
("The term 'risk' includes any event or action that will adversely affect an organization's
ability to achieve its business objectives and execute its strategies successfully." (internal
quotations and citation omitted)).
250. See Louise Amoore, Risk, Reward and Discipline at Work, 33 Econ. & Soc'y 174,
180 (2004); Brian J. Glenn, Risk, Insurance and the Changing Nature of Mutual Obligation,

28 Law & Soc. Inquiry 295, 297 (2003) (reviewing Embracing Risk: The Changing Culture
of Insurance and Responsibility (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002)).
251. Simon, supra note 33, at 22-23.
252. Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?

The Corporate Counselor After

Enron, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1185, 1191 (2003).
253. See id. at 1192 (discussing the proposition that a corporation's "'managers have no
general obligation to avoid violating regulatory laws, when violations are profitable to the
firm"') (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of
Tender Offers, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1155, 1168 n.36, 1177 n.57 (1982)); see also Donald C.
Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law,

2002 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 71, 79 (analyzing compliance by defining it as that which will
"maximize the firm's income over the long run").
254. Dorothy Thornton et al., General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental
Behavior, 27 Law & Pol'y 262, 264 (2005). Thornton et al. cite an Environmental
Protection Agency study that found a twenty-five percent rate of noncompliance. Id. at 283
n.3.
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will be invoked, and subconsciously
twisted in self-serving fashion, to
255
justify unlawful behavior.
The risk-taking culture of executives can be constrained by the fact that
executives operate within a context of contacts with diverse stakeholders.
For executives, rationality consists of "informal, flexible and expedient
strategies of problem-solving and crisis management based on bargaining
and negotiation" between and among the relevant stakeholders. 256 One
particular group of contacts is with regulators. Except in times of scandal,
corporations do not interact with regulatory agencies that "go by the book."
These regulatory agencies have "risk logics. ' '257 Together, corporations,
regulators, and other stakeholders create discourses of risk logics. 258 These
are depoliticized discourses, where choices of the legislature are subsumed
in the corporate logic of risk management. 259 These discourses are
potentially inclusive, however, because integrated risk management
examines reactions by all stakeholders, including regulators. 260
Compliance-related behavior emerges from these risk logics, rather than
from either the deterrence function of legal enforcement or the expressive
function of legislation. 26 1 These logics determine which rules will be
followed and where legal risks are to be taken. It is in relation to this nexus
of contacts that executives identify the "efficient investment[s] in
compliance." 2 62 This process defines the corporate "social license. '2 63
Companies have different risk portfolios. Some will play close to the
line on environmental matters, but be "holier than thou" on financial
reporting. Some may play fast and loose on labor relations, but contribute
mightily to local charities. Enron, for example, was "an exemplary
255. Langevoort, supra note 193, at 672; see also Robert Eli Rosen, Risk Management
and CorporateGovernance: The Case of Enron, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1157, 1170-72 (2003).
256. Wolf Heydebrand, Process Rationality as Legal Governance: A Comparative
Perspective, 18 Int'l Soc. 325, 325 (2003).

257. Glenn, supra note 250, at 311 (quoting Richard V. Erikson & Kevin D. Haggerty,
The Policing of Risk, in Embracing Risk, supra note 250, at 253).
258. See Neil Gunningham & Robert A. Kagan, Regulation and Business Behavior, 27

Law & Pol'y 213 (2005) (providing an overview of literature on the relationship between
regulatory norms and business behavior).
259. "Acceptable-risk decisions require hard choices .... Congress has often passed the
buck to regulators ....

Congress must clearly state what it believes the will of the people to

be. That goal is not achieved by mandating unrealistic standards like zero risk." Fischhoff et
al., supra note 247, at 153. My colleague Patrick Gudridge suggests that I am consequently
describing second-order risk management whose presence should influence first-order
decision making.
260. See, e.g., Thomas Barton et al., supra note 249, at 198-212; Fischhoff et al., supra
note 247, at 142-44.
261. Julia Black, The Emergence of Risk-Based Regulation and the New Public Risk
Management in the United Kingdom, Pub. L., Autumn 2005, at 512 (2005) (describing

regulation of financial services in the United Kingdom).
262. Williams, supra note 248, at 1293.
263. Neil Gunningham et al., Social License and Environmental Protection: Why
Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 Law & Soc. Inquiry 307, 307 (2004). Gunningham
et al. assert that the social license is based upon the expectations of "local communities, the
wider society, and various constituent groups." Id. at 313.
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corporate citizen.... [Corporations] are rarely as consistently virtuous or
corrupt as the media portrays them. Corporations are complex institutions
264 The pressures shape
and they are subject to a wide variety of pressures."265
the risk portfolios that different corporations calry.
Constructing legal compliance by risk logics that emerge from a process
shaped by a company's nexus of contacts and the pressures negotiated
therein suffers from two basic problems. First, the risk logics are
unaccountable. They make power, but they do not reveal it. 266 They
generate decisions that are shaped and justified by process:
They
incorporate stakeholders. They are not justified by publicized substantive
choices. 2 67 Second, the management of legal risks is improperly organized,
and therefore the risk logics do not provide constraints.
It is a basic principle of risk management that those who originate and
manage risks should not be the ones who set risk policy and monitor
compliance with that policy. 268 A salesman paid on commission is a poor
choice for determining customer creditworthiness.
In most corporate
functions "key monitoring and even evaluation functions are more likely to
be performed by people who have no strong personal contact with the
'269
person monitored or evaluated.
The legal department manages legal risk, sets legal risk policy, and
monitors compliance with that policy. As lawyers join project teams, it also
may be said that they originate the legal risks.
Consider a report on British Telecom ("BT"):
[B]efore privatization ...no level of [legal and regulatory] risk was
acceptable .... BT is now a player in one of the world's fastest moving
and most competitive markets ...[which] does not give the company the

luxury of spending hours ensuring that all possible legal and regulatory
risks have been eliminated ....Lawyers in the team are expected to be as
commercial as the customers they advise and to feed the risk assessment
into the overall business decision .... In these circumstances, there can

264. David Vogel, The Split Personality of Corporate America, The Responsive

Community, Winter 2002/2003, at 7, 8-9.
265. This discussion has assumed that corporations are internally organized to carry out
executive decisions. Of course, that need not be the case. For a discussion of how peering
inside the black box of the firm complicates regulation, see Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation,
Compliance and the Firm, 76 Temp. L. Rev. 451 (2003).
266. See Richard L. Abel, Risk as an Arena of Political Struggle, 83 Mich. L, Rev. 772,

783 (1985). Abel notes that
although the regulatory regime was enacted by Congress, Bardach and Kagan
argue that it does not deserve respect because it deviates from "norms of social
responsibility"-although once again they offer no evidence for the content of
these norms, who holds them, or how they deviate from the regulations.
Id.
267. See Heydebrand, supra note 256 (criticizing regulation through informal, negotiated
processes).
268. See, e.g., Kevin S. Buehler & Gunnar Pritsch, Running with Risk: McKinsey on
Finance 7, 9 (2004).
269. Simon, supra note 33, at 22; see also id. at 23-24.
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be no official "risk threshold". The level of risk is assessed on a case by
27 0
case basis.
Because legal departments both define and manage risk, the
commitments made to other stakeholders may be undone by the interests of
those who manage the risks. Like all of us, inside counsel may be swayed
by more immediate concerns. They need to be monitored for compliance
with the risk policies that are being set by the negotiations among all the
stakeholders.
A QLCC offers the potential for creating the essential separation needed
for risk management. The legal department would manage the legal risks,
and the board would set the appropriate levels of compliance and oversee
internal control processes that monitor whether those levels are being
adhered to.
Realizing this potential may be understood as simply
implementing the appropriate "substantive role of the board."' 271 There are
two difficulties, however, with realizing this potential. First, directors are
not engaged in the nexus of contacts between the corporation's
stakeholders. They cannot function as mediating hierarchs. Second, the
QLCC would make the board accountable for noncompliance.
Executives, unlike board members, are entangled in a web of relations
with corporate stakeholders.
They are in contact with regulators,
investment bankers, and so on. Their decisions derive from a nexus of
contacts with interested parties. To board members, the parameters of
efficient compliance are determined by a set of professional opinions, few
of which do not simply justify the decisions that management prefers. Of
those opinions that are independent, however, their authors are most likely
independent from the corporation and thus not likely to be grounded by
contacts with corporate stakeholders. In sum, directors normally do not
become aware of the non-legally enforceable norms embodied in the risk
logics that guide executive action.
Even with a QLCC, board members would be confronting "law
compliance in the abstract." 272 Replacing corporate officers on boards with
independent directors increases the abstraction.
The QLCC not only
presumes compliance, it also presumes command-and-control styles of state
regulation. In fact, regulation is a negotiated process, and directors are
rarely part of that process.
A QLCC could leave the normal determination of compliance levels to
executives and serve only to strategize about these levels. Individual
reports would occasion corporate self-examination.
QLCCs could be
another contact in executives' nexus of contacts and could be part of the
270. Murphy, supra note 207, at 65 (quoting British Telecom's regulatory compliance
officer).
271. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directorsand Internal Control, 19 Cardozo L.
Rev. 237, 240 (1997) (emphasis omitted).

272. Williams, supra note 248, at 1304 (quoting The Bus. Roundtable, Statement of the
Business Roundtable on the American Law Institute's Proposed "Principles of Corporate
Governance and Structure: Restatement and Recommendations" 45 (1983)).
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negotiating process. So limited, QLCCs might not have the disadvantages
of making decisions from scratch in the abstract.
QLCCs, however, require directors to act by a voting process.
Discussion and decisions would be recorded in the committee's minutes.
QLCCs thus have the potential for making directors accountable for
corporate legal compliance decisions. By making transparent decisions, the
QLCC allows corporations to be held to account, understanding that "to be
,accountable' for one's activities is to explicate the reasons for them and to
'2 73
supply the normative grounds whereby they may be justified.
Creating a process for transparent decisions in response to particular
reports of violations solves a basic problem of self-regulation. Christine
Parker usefully argues that, unless regulators publicly report on corporate
substantive compliance, regulators can too easily be corrupted. 274 She
marshals evidence showing that regulators' "compliance program audits
focus more on reviewing (and recommending improvements to) the systems
elements of the compliance program, rather than its compliance
performance." 275 This "delivers the message that the compliance program
is essentially adequate and that problems are merely aberrations." 276 A
QLCC solves this problem by having the corporation, rather than the
regulators, publicly report on substantive compliance, at least in response to
the violations reported to it.
But why should a board adopt this transparent process?
SOX's and the SEC's strategy of raising issues up the ladder presumes
that directors are more interested in legal compliance than are executives.
Normal agency-cost analysis challenges this presumption.
The
representative function of directors also does not support it. Directors'
fears of liability might explain it, but these fears also explain why directors
do not want issues raised up the ladder.
As compared to directors, managers and executives have greater
nondiversified investments in the firm. Executives are not only likely to
have a greater portion of their wealth invested in the company, but their
future prospects for generating wealth are also more closely tied to a
specific company. Their investments, especially in the form of human
capital, are relatively illiquid. They have greater incentives than directors
to be risk averse in regards to corporate losses from discoverable
noncompliance. Except in "last period" scenarios, directors are more likely
to approve noncompliance than executives.

273. Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society 30 (1984), quoted in Beyond Agency
Conceptions, supra note 162, at S10.
274. See Christine Parker, Regulator-RequiredCorporate Compliance Program Audits,

25 Law & Pol'y 221, 223 (2003).
275. Id. at 224.
276. Id. at 234.
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As representatives of shareholders, in large public companies where
shareholders have diversified portfolios, 277 directors have further incentives
to act with less risk aversion than executives in regards to compliance. The
shareholder is concerned about market risks, but not company-specific
risks. As the shareholder's representatives, directors should approve risktaking activities. For example, a board represents shareholders when it
decides not to disclose material that has negative impact on stock price.
even when advised by
Boards have done so and have refused to disclose
27 8
lawyers that they are legally obligated to disclose.
If directors are more risk averse, it is because of their own interests, not
those of shareholders. Imposing director liability is conducive to creating
but also to
this risk averseness (and consequently greater legal compliance), 279
creating a conflict of interest between directors and shareholders.
The SEC asserts that service on QLCCs will not increase director
liability: "[T]he commission does not intend service on a QLCC to increase
the liability of any member of a board of directors under state law and,
indeed, expressly finds that it would be inconsistent with the public interest
for a court to so conclude." 280 The conflict between the interests of
shareholders and directors' fears of liability is hidden, while it is exploited
by the SEC in hopes of increasing compliance.
Nonetheless, lawyers reported that they did not recommend QLCCs
because directors would be concerned about their liability. For example,
"[d]irectors might be reluctant to join a QLCC before the... legal risks of
the position become more apparent."'28' Lawyers have reasons to overstate
legal risks and may be doing so here. 282 But the hesitance to recommend
QLCCs because of liability fears is not without substance: "Courts have

277. See Steven S. Cherensky, Shareholders,Managers, and Corporate R&D Spending:
An Agency Cost Model, 10 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 299, 317-21 (1994)

(differentiating between indexed, undiversified, and diversified shareholder interests).
2004,
13,
Catalog of Horrors, Law.com, Feb.
278. Paul Braverman,
(discussing a suit against Spiegel
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1071719723587
Inc. for failing to include in its annual 10-K Form its auditor's conclusion that there was
"substantial doubt about the company's ability to continue as a going concern for a
reasonable period of time").
279. "[T]he body of independent directors may be the internal corporate constituency
whose personal cost benefit analysis is least well synchronized with that of the corporation
and its shareholders." Simon Lorne, The Perplexity and Perversity of the New Lawyer
2003,
July
11,
Briefing,
Business
Mondaq
Rules,
Conduct

http://securities.stanford.edu/news-archive/2003/200307 11_Headline01 _Lorne.htm.
280. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg.
6296, 6305 (Feb. 6, 2003) (final rule).
281. Romanek & Winer, supra note 191, at 54.
282. See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role
of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 375 (1997) (analyzing

reasons for lawyers' overstating legal risks). It is interesting to consider which risks are
overstated and which are not. Why is the risk of an associate going to the SEC not
overstated? Langevoort and Rasmussen's behavioral approach, unfortunately, does not help
answer such questions. The business press also can overemphasize liabilities. See Ajit
Kambil & Bruce Beebe, Springboard to a Swan Dive?, Harv. Bus. Rev., Feb. 2005, at 59.
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directors to
created a muddled law governing the liability of corporate
2 83
corporation.
a
of
acts
illegal
the
for
securities
of
holders
Theoretically, a director who knowingly approves actions that violate the
law violates her duty of care. 2 84 Statutorily, directors have no immunity for
damages arising from a "knowing violation of law."'285 Officially,
corporations adopt codes of conduct requiring compliance with the law.
to violate the law were
Historically, directors who caused the corporation 286
liable to the corporation for these ultra vires actions.
Realistically, directors have not faced liability to shareholders, even
when they intentionally cause the corporation to violate the law. 2 87 The
legal principle that directors may not knowingly approve illegal actions is
limited, in practice, by requiring proof of "knowing" according to a high
standard, or by requiring culpability in addition to knowledge. Liability
may be negated by the existence of a lawyer's opinion that the action was
not clearly illegal, or liability may be rendered immaterial by allowing
indemnification. 288 Corporate codes of conduct are not understood to
create liability. Except for those caught up in moral panics, directors can
rely on history's having empowered corporations, not limited them, and
protected directors, not allowed them to be sanctioned.
There is ambiguity about the board's obligation to obey the law. 289 This
can stimulate compliance, as directors strive to reduce uncertainty, even
But this
when directors are not sanctioned for noncompliance. 290
uncertainty does not work to stimulate the adoption of QLCCs. First,
reports to the QLCC can themselves hurt corporations, even if they are
unfounded. It is not noncompliance that negatively affects stock price, but

283. Geoffrey Rapp, On the Liability of CorporateDirectors to Holders of Securitiesfor
Illegal Corporate Acts: Can the Tension Between the "Net-Loss" and "No-Duty-toDisclose" Rules Be Resolved, 7 Fordham J.Corp & Fin. L. 101, 102 (2001).

284. See Am. Law Inst., Principles of Corporate Governance:
Recommendations, §§ 2.01(b)(1) cmt. G, 4.01 cmt. D (1992).
285. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (2004).

Analysis

and

286. See Norwood P. Beveridge, Does the Corporate Director Have a Duty Always to
Obey the Law?, 45 DePaul L. Rev. 729, 731 (1996). See generally Kent Greenfield, Ultra
Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With Notes on How Corporate
Law Could Reinforce InternationalLaw Nonns), 87 Va. L. Rev. 1279 (2001).

287. See generally Beveridge, supra note 286, at 743-45 (describing how, in practice, the
"net-loss" and pre-suit demand requirements prevent directors from incurring liability).
288. Id. at 746-54. Even in the high-watermark case for board responsibility, the board
was authorized to engage in conduct when it had been "informed by experts that the
company's practices" were "contestable." In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698
A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
289. See Dennis J. Block et al., 1 The Business Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties of
Corporate Directors 91 (5th ed. 1998) (emphasizing "the limited case law on point");
Constance Frisby Fain, CorporateDirectorand Officer Liability, 18 U. Ark. Little Rock L.

Rev. 417 (1996) (emphasizing the unpredictability of liability).
290. "Regulated business firms' perceptions of legal risk play a far more important role in
shaping firm behavior than the objective likelihood of legal sanctions." Neil A. Gunningham
et al., Motivating Management: Corporate Compliance in Environmental Protection, 27

Law & Pol'y 289, 290 (2005) (citations omitted).
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an announcement or allegations of noncompliance. 2 9 1 Second, by putting
directors on notice, the QLCC can only increase the possibilities of director
liability. As Steven Lauer notes, "If a board has received information
through the [QLCC,] . . . [s]ome sort of duty to investigate probably
[arises] .... For that reason, simply setting up a [QLCC] might create more
292
liability than it satisfies."

If directors' fears of liability make them more risk-averse than managers
regarding legal compliance, then it also explains why they, and the lawyers
who advise them, will resist the establishment of QLCCs. For directors,
their involvement in legal compliance has only downside risks. This, then,
is merely another instance of standards of liability favoring corporations
taking uninformed decisions. 293 Directors seek to evade the coalface.
III. SECRETARY: AN EFFECTIVE CONDUIT BETWEEN BOARD AND
MANAGEMENT

All lawyers who work for a corporation are conflicted when advising the
board about whether or not to adopt QLCCs. 294 As Robert Marmer et al.
have noted, "[A]n issuer's CLO and its regular outside securities counsel
may have their own interests in the compliance and reporting procedures
that the issuer adopts and providing legal advice on these procedures may

involve conflicts of interest. '295 Yet interviewed lawyers failed to spot
these conflicts.
The board is entitled to and needs unbiased advice on governance
possibilities. At least one court has required the CLO to perform this
educational role. 296 It is doubtful, however, whether CLOs can be unbiased
about QLCCs. More important, a CLO is unlikely to entertain the board's
perspective on governance. QLCCs, for example, may be valuable not only
for their effectiveness in responding to lawyer reports, but also as "'legal
cover' [for directors] to engage in a number of practices designed to

291. See Williams, supra note 134, at 1278-82 (citations omitted).
292. Steven A. Lauer, CorporateEthics Fine-Tuned, Legal Times, June 21, 2004, at 23.
293. See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 Stan. L. Rev.
547, 586 (2000) (discussing a study that revealed that citizen-jurors imposed higher damages
on companies that conducted cost-benefit analyses, and observing that "many of the most
well-known cases involving punitive damages are also those in which corporations
undertook a risk analysis, or in some cases, a sound benefit-cost analysis").
294. If inside counsel oppose QLCCs, their self-interest in not being reviewed creates a
potential bias. If inside counsel favor QLCCs, their self-interest in avoiding accountability
creates a potential bias. If outside counsel who have been retained by the issuer oppose
QLCCs, their interest in currying favor with those who purchase their services-inside
lawyers and management--creates a potential bias. If they favor QLCCs, outside counsel
may be biased by desires either to have direct access to the highest powers or to avoid
troubling professional responsibilities.
295. Robert L. Marmer et al., How to Conduct Internal CorporateInvestigations After
Sarbanes-Oxley, A.L.I.-A.B.A. Bus. L. Course Materials J., Dec. 2004, at 25.
296. See Pereira v. Cogan, No. 00 Civ. 619, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7818, at *182
(S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2003) (requiring general counsel to explain corporate governance
possibilities to the board), rev'd sub nom., Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 2005).
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improve board culture and empower the independent directors vis-A-vis
management. '2 97 CLOs, as part of management, are not in a position to
render such advice.
Recognizing these conflicts of interest, Professors Geoffrey C. Hazard
and Edward B. Rock 29 8 and Professor James CoX, 2 9 9 echoing an idea once
advanced by Justice Arthur Goldberg, 300 have called for the board to hire an
outside firm to be its counsel. Hazard and Rock suggest that the
responsibilities imposed on the audit, nominating, and compensation
committees will lead to the emergence of "the Independent Directors'
Counsel" ("IDC").30 1 The IDC is the carrier of the "independent and
influential counselor" image of the legal role. 30 2 The IDC could provide
unconflicted corporate governance advice to the board.
Hazard and Rock describe not the emergence, but the reemergence of the
IDC. When inside counsel were under the tutelage of outside counsel,
many outside counsel functioned as IDCs. A member of an outside firm
was often a member of the board. He or another lawyer at his firm served
as the board's secretary. Later, the secretarial role was split off and the
general counsel became the board's secretary. But the general counsel was
still a functionary of the outside law firm. He was someone who did not
make partner and had no resources to stand up to the outside firm. The
inside counsel movement changed that, and the board's secretary became
the "enlightened" CLO, whose allocation of work to different outside firms
gave him power over outside counsel. 30 3
As a result, when the
"independent and influential counselor" appeared, the role was played by
the CLO.
Hazard and Rock's strongest argument for the reemergence of IDCs is
that, when independent directors meet outside the presence of any senior

297. Developments in the Law: Corporationsand Society, supra note 166, at 2197.

298. Hazard & Rock, supra note 152.
299. James D. Cox, Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering the
Outside Directors with Independent Counsel, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 1077 (2003).

300. See id. at 1090 n.42 (citing Arthur J. Goldberg, Debate on Outside Directors, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 29, 1972, § 3, at 1).
301. See Hazard & Rock, supra note 152, at 1396; see also Davis, supra note 128, at 26
(observing that audit committees hire outside firms who are not their regular counsel). Zion
Oil and Gas, Inc., established a "QLCC Counsel," but authorized the QLCC to select the
CLO as the committee's counsel. Zion Oil & Gas, Inc., Audit Committee Charter, QLCC
Addendum,

Part

205

Report

Procedures

(2),

available

at

http://www.zionoil.comlcompany/auditcharter.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2005) (Notice and
Meeting).
302. For a discussion of the "independent and influential counselor" role and its declining
significance for outside counsel in the last decades of the twentieth century, see Robert A.
Kagan & Robert Eli Rosen, On the Social Significance of Large Law Firm Practice, 37 Stan.
L. Rev. 399 (1985). Like either the outside or inside counsel in the "independent and
influential counselor" image, the Independent Directors' Counsel ("IDC") will emphasize
the advantages that accrue from the fact that they "will be more familiar with the company
and will have already established a relationship with the independent directors." Hazard &
Rock, supra note 152, at 1404.
303. See Rosen, supra note 118, at 479.
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officer, they will not be able to include the CLO in their meeting. The need
for corporate minutes of executive sessions, to establish due care, 30 4 creates
a problem when the general counsel is also the secretary. One answer is for
"a committee member to 'debrief the corporate secretary after an executive
session on the topics discussed, but to stay away from specifics. '30 5 This is
hardly ideal. Hazard and Rock conclude that "either the meeting has to be
held without a lawyer being present (clearly a bad idea), or the independent
' '30 6
directors will need an IDC.

This conclusion follows because Hazard and Rock presume that the
board's secretary is the general counsel. This is not necessarily the case.
The secretary can be an agent of the board, independent of other corporate
functions.
Hazard and Rock's presumption reflects current realities for the largest
corporations. A survey of CLOs found that more than one-half of them
were also the corporate secretary. 30 7 The same survey found that, in other
corporations, the secretary reported to the CLO. In total, in eighty-one
percent of companies, the corporate secretary either was or reported to the
general counsel. 3°8 A survey of corporate secretaries found that nearly
seven out of ten have law degrees. 30 9 This survey did not find the same
proportion of secretaries reporting to the CLO, but less than half reported to
the board and only thirty-eight percent had their compensation set by the
board or the compensation committee. 310 Both surveys confirm the
likelihood that the board's secretary is not independent and often is
beholden to the CLO.
An effective board is one that has properly managed information flowing
to it from all parts of the corporation. 3 11 What boards need is someone to
fill the role of "[g]etting the 'right' information to boards and helping them

304. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21359 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2003); Hollinger Int'l Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022 (Del. Ch.
2004).
305. General Counsel Is Gatekeeper: Must Get 'Right' Information to Board, Corp.
Accountability Rep. (BNA), Feb. 18, 2005, at 157, 158.

306. Hazard & Rock, supra note 152, at 1403.
307. See Ass'n of Corp. Counsel, supra note 125, at 10 (quoting Altman Weil Inc. &
Ass'n of Corp. Counsel, supra note 125).
308. Id. at 9.
309. Soc'y of Corp. Sec'ys & Governance Prof ls & Korn/Ferry Int'l, Compensation
Survey Report 2004, at 3 (2004). Not all of those secretaries also represent the corporation
as a lawyer. Compare Tables A and B of the survey. Id. But see id. at 4 (Table E)
(observing that seventy-two percent of corporate secretaries' departments were located in
legal departments).
310. Id.at5tbl.G.
311. The Council of Institutional Investors guidelines now require the board to "name a
lead independent director who would have approval over information flow to the board,
meeting agenda, and meeting schedules to ensure balance between the powers of the CEO
and the independent directors." Alison Carpenter, Investor Group at Crossroads, Mulls
Playing More Active Role, Corp. Accountability Rep. (BNA), Oct. 29, 2004, at 1154, 1155.
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understand corporate strategy and issues relating to risk."' 3 12 The ABA's
Cheek Report determined that there was a need for boards to establish
"[p]rocesses for setting agendas and distributing information." 3 13 It also
recommended the "maintenance of a training and education program for all
directors ... in regard to ... the financial condition, the principal operating
risks and the performance factors" of the corporation, among other
things. 314 Who can perform these functions?
What the board needs is not so much a wise counselor, as an effective
conduit between it and management.
General counsel like to see
themselves in this role, serving as a "bridge between the executive
management of the company and the board. '3 15 But this can lead to
conflicts, as with QLCCs. What the board needs is its own conduit.
Some companies have created a conduit by creating a role for a
"governance officer." A chief governance officer is "often a legally trained
executive who oversees a company's corporate governance issues and acts
as a liaison with the board and with investors." 3 16 In other corporations, the
conduit may lead an "office of strategy management" whose task is to
communicate corporate strategies, reinforce strategy priorities among
executives, serve as the "guardian of the [strategy] scorecard... [who]
standardizes the terminology and measurement definitions across the
3 17
organization... and ensure[] the integrity of the... data."
Whatever the role is named and however its parameters are defined, the
conduit between the board and management must be independent from the
executives and management.
The conduit must afford the board
"competitive sources of information" to respond to the gaps in knowledge
3 18
that may be presented to the board.
Instead of Hazard and Rock's "iDC," I propose that large corporations
segregate the office of the CLO and that of the secretary to the board of
directors. For smaller corporations, the costs of this segregation may be too
high. These costs, however, are reduced as the parameters of the
secretary's job are expanded-for example, by making the secretary also
the corporate governance, internal audit, or strategy management officer.
Today, the corporate secretarial function is ministerial. The secretary
deals with mundane, detailed, paper-shuffling, time-consuming tasks. The
secretary sends out meeting notices, maintains calendars, takes charge of
312. General Counsel Is Gatekeeper: Must Get 'Right' Information to Board, supra note

305, at 157 (quoting Holly J. Gregory, Partner, Corporate Governance Group, Weil, Gotshal
& Manges LLP).
313. Cheek Report, supra note 14, at 71.
314. Id. at72.
315. Hackett, supra note 119, at 25.
316. Tamara Loomis, Companies Are Hiring Chief Governance Officers, Nat'l L.J., May

5, 2003, at A15.
317. Robert S. Kaplan & David P. Norton, The Office of Strategy Management, Harv.
Bus. Rev., Oct. 2005, at 72, 76.
318. Eisenberg, supra note 271, at 246 (arguing that the internal audit function be placed
under the board's control).
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and maintains books and records, issues certificates of authority, keeps the
insurance and shareholder lists up-to-date, and so on. It is not difficult to
understand why it has been ignored in discussions of reforming corporate
governance.
Many of these tasks may be expanded to suit the needs of effective
boards.
The secretary, for example, is in charge of collating and
distributing materials for meetings. Ensuring that the appropriate materials
are before the board, preparing them in a manner accessible to the different
members of the board, sometimes developing the materials themselves, are
all necessary for an effective meeting. Today, this is usually not the
secretary's task, nor often is it anyone else's. Expanding the secretarial role
is one option for ensuring that the right information gets to the board.
Because the secretary typically causes reports to be filed with the SEC,
including insider trading reports, the secretary is in contact with multiple
sources of information. A good secretary is a superb informational
intermediary. An effective board needs a secretary who can proactively
develop contacts and determine what information is needed by the board.
The secretary typically authors the corporate minutes. Writing corporate
minutes has always been an art form. It is a form that must be responsive to
the changing work and style of the board. A board is entitled to expect that
the minutes will be drafted with their interests, among others, in mind. A
legally trained individual whom the board hired would best meet such
needs. Members of the legal department, however, can be conflicted as the
board becomes more actively engaged in monitoring compliance. A legally
trained secretary who reports to and whose compensation is determined by
the board would better serve board interests.
Hazard and Rock describe a function that needs to be performed for
boards to be effective. Their IDC solution, however, has a basic problem
for a board uncertain about liability: The retention of an IDC may show
that the board was aware of the existence of a conflict.3 19 Having the IDC
role performed by an ongoing functionary of the board, such as a secretary,
mitigates this problem. The board's secretary may be an outside counsel, as
has been the case in the past. An employee of the board who is located in
corporate headquarters, however, has the advantage of the informal contacts
that location makes possible. Good secretaries know the value to their
superiors of water fountains and coffee pots.

319. In fact, Hazard and Rock do not suggest that the directors' lawyers will be
independent from them. For example, "in at least a significant proportion of these situations,
the IDC may not be considered sufficiently independent." Hazard & Rock, supra note 152,
at 1412; see also Frank Aquila & Barbara Lynn Bums, Too Many Cooks? SeparateAdvisors
for Independent Directors in M&A Transactions,8 M&A Law. 16 (2005) (asserting that the
retention of separate counsel as IDC is evidence of the board's knowledge that it had a
conflict).
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CONCLUSION

This is a story of resistance. Legal professionals, both inside and outside
the corporation, have decided that QLCCs threaten dominant hierarchical
relations. Perhaps it is simply that "any alternative to the existing
structure... appear[s] as a threat" and lawyers can be "expect[ed] ... to
play a conservative role."'3 20 But resistance to QLCCs constructs a
boundary between the corporation and its legal environment. There is a
buffering, a sealing off, of the Board of Directors from both the managerial
core and from responsibility for legal compliance. Resistance to QLCCs is
resistance to transparency about corporate legal and regulatory
noncompliance.
Much of this resistance has not been straightforward. Lawyers have
manufactured uncertainty about QLCCs. The ACC claims to be "generally
supportive of the QLCC conceptually" but is "withholding final judgment
until we know more about how it will actually operate." 321 CLOs,
however, can greatly influence how the QLCC operates at their
corporation. 322 Outside counsel also advise clients about uncertainties
regarding QLCCs. For example, one detailed memo concludes that it is
"not entirely clear how the QLCC will actually function," and that there is a
"lack of guidance," "[no] definitive answers," "no clear standard," and a
"lack of clarity." 323 Yet, to this memo, the firm attaches model QLCC
policies. Another offers tepid support for QLCCs, while advising clients
that others have not adopted QLCCs and noting that whether one should
adopt a QLCC depends on unstated
characteristics of the corporation's
324
"own culture, structure and needs."

Organizations and professional actors can implement procedures even in
the face of vague regulations, as the model policies presented indicate. In
fact, the vagueness of a legal regime can become an incentive for the
adoption of innovations. 325 Resistance to QLCCs is another story of legal
professionals maintaining boundaries between democratic politics and the
governance of corporations. Lawyers, through their practices and their
ideologies of practice, construct and maintain these boundaries.

320. Asaf Darr & Robert N. Stern, Coopting Change Toward Industrial Democracy:
Professions as Agents of Structural Constraint,72 Soc. Inquiry 171, 174 (2002).

321. Romanek & Winer, supra note 191, at 54 app. (ACCA'S Practical Tips for Dealing
with the New Attorney Responsibility Standards Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Tip #3).
322. See supra notes 164-74 and accompanying text.
323. McLaughlin et al., supra note 59, at 16.
324. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, SEC "Up-the-Ladder" Reporting
Requirement:
Practical Suggestions for In-House Attorneys 1 (2003), available at
http://www.ffhsj.com/cmemos/030718_Ladder.pdf. But see Catharine E. Stark, Comment,
Regulating CorporateGovernance: Amended Rules of Professional Conduct Allow Lawyers
to Make the World a More Ethical Place, 53 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1195, 1222 (2004) (arguing

that this memo encourages corporations to form QLCCs ).
325. See Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational

Mediation in Civil Rights Law, 97 Am. J. Soc. 1531 (1992).
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The QLCC is not the first proposal for involving the board in legal
compliance. In response to proposals considered by the American Law
Institute in developing its Principles of Corporate Governance, the Business
Roundtable argued that "[a] free-floating concern with law compliance in
the abstract would ... open directors to unfair liability for acts committed
by others of which they had neither knowledge nor notice." 32 6 This
argument carried the day and the proposals were rejected. The QLCC,
however, responds to the Business Roundtable's argument, because a
QLCC is a dormant committee until an attorney provides it with material
evidence. Furthermore, the QLCC requires limited involvement of the
board in compliance. The board becomes involved only when an attorney
cannot resolve his or her ethical concerns, despite economic and
organizational incentives to do so. Nevertheless, lawyers resist QLCC
formation. Rather than being agents for greater involvement of the board in
legal compliance, lawyers have stymied corporate governance reform.
Given that boards "are likely to rely heavily on... their attorneys'
advice," 327 pressures other than coercion do not appear capable of engaging
the board in legal compliance.
Legal compliance, it should be noted, is a minimal legitimacy demand.
Given corporate powers, legitimacy may demand that corporations consider
the public interest in its actions. 3 28 Given the range of interests that
corporations effect, and given the diversity of corporations' stakeholders,
legitimacy may demand that corporations be democratically
accountable by
329
incorporating stakeholders in corporate decision making.
The focus of this Article on structuring decisions about legal compliance,
although important and appropriate for an analysis of QLCCs, needs to be
contextualized. QLCCs emerged in response to the fin de sikcle corporate
scandals. These public, corporate failures are constructed as breaches of
law. 330 Directors are presumed to approve such breaches unknowingly; had
the board known of the illegalities, they would have prevented the scandals.
Of course, this story-even if obvious-is constructed, not necessary. Its
presumption that the scandals resulted not from normal business behavior,
but from legal noncompliance, is particularly problematic. When I was
growing up, the only businesses that consistently made twenty-six percent
profits were loan sharks, and they had to break legs to do so. Now, even
my local newspaper is required to make at least that rate of return.
326. Williams, supra note 248, at 1304 (quoting The Bus. Roundtable, supra note 272, at

45).
327. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 14, at 546.
328. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Social Responsibility Redux, 76 Tul. L.

Rev. 1207, 1212-16 (2002); Kellye Y. Testy, Convergence as Movement: Toward a
Counter-Hegemonic Approach to Corporate Governance, 24 Law & Pol'y, 433, 436-37
(2002).
329. For a thoughtful analysis, see Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective
Self-Regulation and Democracy (2002).
330. But see Rosen, supra note 255, at 1171 (characterizing Enron's demise as resulting,
not from legal violations, but from bad business decisions).
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The focus of QLCCs on hierarchical control of corporate noncompliance
also needs to be contextualized. In the corporate world, hierarchy is giving
way to markets, both those internal to the corporation and those outside it.
Inside the corporation, command-and-control organization of power is
giving way to project team organization. 33 1 The escape of project teams
332
from hierarchical oversight was one cause of the Enron scandal.
Corporations also externalize noncompliance by outsourcing; in other
words, by increasingly relying on markets outside of the corporation.
Instead of utilizing hierarchy, corporations are increasingly using contracts
and finding means, not only to prevent holdups, but also to gain leverage
over their contracting partners. Increasing board control over corporate
actors, such as through the adoption of QLCCs, increases hierarchy costs,
thereby rendering more palatable the costs of negotiating and writing
contracts and the costs of monitoring and enforcing contractual
performance. The externalization of legal responsibility is as much a story
of our times as is the diffusion of QLCCs.

331. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
332. See generally Rosen, supra note 255, at 1166.
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APPENDIX: COMPANIES THAT REPORTED TO EDGAR 333 THAT THEY
ESTABLISHED QLCCs BETWEEN OCTOBER 1, 2002, AND

SEPTEMBER 30, 2005
ACUSPHERE INC.
ADAPTEC INC.
ADVANCED MAGNETICS
ADVISORS SERIES TRUST
ADVO INC.
AGU ENTERTAINMENT
AlP ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES
FUND
ALBANY INTERNATIONAL CO.
ALKERMES
ALTIRIS INC.
AMERICAN BUSINESS &
FINANCIAL SERVICES
AMERICAN INCOME FUND
AMERICAN MUNICIPAL INCOME
PORTFOLIO
AMERICAN PHYSICIANS CAPITAL
AMERICAN POWER CONVERSION
CORP.
AMERICAN SELECT PORTFOLIO
FUNDS
AMERICAN STRATEGIC INCOME
PORTFOLIO I
AMERICAN STRATEGIC INCOME
PORTFOLIO II
AMERICAN STRATEGIC INCOME
PORTFOLIO III
AMERINDO FUNDS
AMERIVEST PROPERTIES
AMPCO PITrSBURGH
AMSTAR INVESTMENT TRUST
APA ENTERPRISES INC.
ARCH CAPITAL GROUP
ARKANSAS BEST
ASSET ALLOCATION TRUST
ASPECT COMMUNICATIONS
ASTEC INDUSTRIES
A T FUNDS INVESTMENT TRUST
ATLANTA SOSNOFF INVESTMENTS
TRUST
ATLAS ASSETS INC.
ATITUNITY LTD.
BANCROFT CONVERTIBLE FUND
BANK ONE CORP.

333. See supra note 36.

BB&T FUNDS
BEAR STEARNS
BECTON DICKINSON & CO.
BEI TECHNOLOGIES
BERKSHIRE BANCORP
BLUECHIP VALUE FUND
BOSTON RESTAURANT
ASSOCIATES
BOULDER GROWTH AND INCOME
FUND
BOULDER TOTAL RETURN FUND
BRANDPARTNERS GROUP INC.
BRANDES INVESTMENT TRUST
BRIDGES INVESTMENT FUND
BROOKTROUT INC.
BRUNSWICK CORP.
BRYCE CAPITAL FUNDS
CALDWELL & ORKIN FUNDS
CALLIDUS SOFTWARE
CALLON PETROLEUM
CALYPTE BIOMEDICAL
CAPITAL ADVISORS GROWTH
FUND
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT
INVESTMENT TRUST
CAPSTONE TURBINE
CARMIKE CINEMAS
CCFNB BANCORP
CDW CORP.
CELL GENESIS
CENTERSTATE BANKS OF
FLORIDA
CHARLES & COLVARD LTD.
CHARTWELL DIVIDEND AND
INCOME FUND
CHROMECRAFT REVINGTON INC.
CIBER INC.
CIGNA HIGH INCOME SHARES
CIGNA INVESTMENT SECURITIES
CITIZENS BANKING CORP.
CITRIX SYSTEMS
CLEAN DIESEL TECHNOLOGIES
CLECO CORP.
CLECO UTILITY GROUP, INC.
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CLOROX INC.
COLE NATIONAL CORP.
COLLECTORS UNIVERSE INC.
COLONIAL PROPERTIES TRUST
COMERICA INC.
COMMERCE BANCORP
COMMERCE ENERGY GROUP
COMMERCE ONE INC.
COMPUWARE
CORNERSTONE STRATEGIC VALUE
FUND
COSI INC.
COST PLUS
COUNTRY MUTUAL FUNDS TRUST
COWLITZ BANCORP
CRAFTMADE INTERNATIONAL
CRANE CO.
CREDIT ACCEPTANCE CORP.
CSFB ALTERNATIVE CAP EVNT
DRIVN FUND
CSFB ALTERNATIVE CAP LONG SH
EQ FUND
CSFB ALTERNATIVE CAP MULTI
STRGY FUND
CSFB ALTERNATIVE CAP RELTV
VAL FUND
CSFB ALTERNATIVE CAP TACTL
TRG FUND
CSK AUTO CORP.
CSP INC.
CULLEN FUNDS TRUST
CYBERKINETICS
NEUROTECHNOLOGY
SYSTEMS
DANIELSON HOLDING CO.
DDI CORP
DELPHI CORP.
DEVELOPED TECHNOLOGY
RESOURCE
DIGIMARC CORP.
DIGIRAD CORP.
DIVERSIFIED CORPORATE
RESOURCES
DOLBY LABORATORIES
DOTHILL SYSTEMS CORP.
DSL NET
ECTEL LTD.
ELLSWORTH CONVERTIBLE
GROWTH & INCOME FUND
EL PASO ELECTRIC CO.
ENERGY INCOME & GROWTH
FUND
ENTERTAINMENT PROPERTIES
TRUST
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ENTROPIN, INC.
EVERGREEN EQUITY TRUST
EVERGREEN FIXED INCOME
TRUST
EVERGREEN INCOME ADVANTAGE
FUND
EVERGREEN INTERNATIONAL
BALANCED INCOME FUND
EVERGREEN INTERNATIONAL
TRUST
EVERGREEN MANAGED INCOME
FUND
EVERGREEN MONEY MARKET
TRUST
EVERGREEN MUNICIPAL TRUST
EVERGREEN RESOURCES, INC.
EVERGREEN SELECT EQUITY
EVERGREEN SELECT FIXED
INCOME TRUST
EVERGREEN SELECT MONEY
MARKET TRUST
EVERGREEN UTILITIES AND HIGH
INCOME FUND
EVERGREEN VARIABLE ANNUITY
TRUST
EVERLAST WORDLWIDE
EXELIXIS INC.
EXTENDED STAY AMERICA
FEI CO.
FIELDSTONE INVESTMENT CORP.
FIRST AMERICAN INSURANCE
PORTFOLIOS
FIRST AMERICAN MINN MUN
INCOMES FUND II
FIRST DATA CORP.
FIRST FINANCIAL FUND, INC.
FIRST NATIONAL LINCOLN CORP.
FIRST REGIONAL BANCORP
FIRST STATE FINANCIAL CORP.
FIRST TRUST ABERDEEN GLBL
OPPTY INCOME FD
FIRST TRUST FIDUCIARY AST
MGMT COVRD CALL FD
FIRST TRUST FOUR CRNRS SR
FLTG RT INC FD
FIRST TRUST FOUR CRNRS SR
FLTG RT INC FD II
FIRST TRUST VALUE LINE
DIVIDEND FUND
FIRST TRUST VALUE LINE 100
FUND
FIRST TRUST VAL LINE &
IBBOTSON EQ ALLOCTN FD
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FLORIDA CHOICE BANKSHARES
INC.
FOOTHILL INDEPENDENT
BANCORP
FOUNDRY NETWORKS
FORT PITT CAPITAL FUNDS
FORUM FUNDS
FRANKLIN TEMPLETON LTD
DURATION INC. TR
FREQUENCY ELECTRONICS
FUEL-TECH N.V.
GAINSCO INC.
GAP INC.
GARDNER LEWIS INVESTMENT
TRUST
GELSTAT CORP.
GENERAL MOTORS CORP.
GEITY REALTY CORP. MARYLAND
GIORDANO INVESTMENT TRUST
GLOBECOMM SYSTEMS
GLYCOGENESYS
GRAFTECH INTERNATIONAL
GRANITE CONSTRUCTION INC.
GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA
CO.
GREENBRIER COS INC.
GREEN CENTURY FUNDS
HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP
HALIFAX CORP.
HANOVER FOODS CORP.
HARDING LOEVNER FUNDS
HAWK
HEICO CORP.
HERITAGE CAPITAL
APPRECIATION TRUST
HERITAGE CASH TRUST
HERITAGE GROWTH & INCOME
TRUST
HERITAGE INCOME TRUST
HERITAGE SERIES TRUST
HEXCEL CORP.
HIGHLAND CORPORATE
OPPORTUNITIES FUND
HIGHLAND FLOATING RATE
ADVANTAGE FUND
HIGHLAND FLOATING RATE LLC
HIGHLAND INSTITUTIONAL
FLOATING RATE INCOME
FUND
HIGH YIELD PLUS FUND INC.
HILLMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT
INVESTMENT TRUST
HILTON HOTELS
HINES HORTICULTURAL
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H&Q HEALTHCARE INVESTORS
H&Q LIFE SCIENCES INVESTORS
HUNTINGTON VA FUNDS
HUNTINGTON FUNDS MA
ICM SERIES TRUST
IMCOR PHARMECEUTICAL
INDYMAC BANCORP
ING GET FUND
ING INVESTORS TRUST
ING MAYFLOWER TRUST
ING MUTUAL FUNDS
ING PARTNERS
ING SENIOR INCOME FUND
ING SERIES FUND
ING STRATEGIC ALLOCATION
PORTFOLIOS
ING VARIABLE FUNDS
ING VARIABLE INSURANCE TRUST
ING VARIABLE PORTFOLIOS
ING VARIABLE PORTFOLIOS
BALANCED PORTFOLIO
ING VARIABLE PORTFOLIOS BOND
PORTFOLIO
ING VARIABLE PORTFOLIOS
MONEY MARKET PORTFOLIO
ING VARIABLE PORTFOLIOS
NATURAL RESOURCES TRUST
ING VARIABLE PRODUCTS TRUST
INTELLIGROUP INC.
INTERMUNE
INTRICON CORP.
J&J SNACK FOODS CORP.
JOHN HANCOCK BANK & THRIFT
OPPORTUNITY FUND
JOHN HANCOCK BOND TRUST
JOHN HANCOCK CA TAX FREE
INCOME FUND
JOHN HANCOCK CAPITAL SERIES
JOHN HANCOCK CURRENT
INTEREST
JOHN HANCOCK EQUITY TRUST
JOHN HANCOCK FINANCIAL
TRENDS FUND
JOHN HANCOCK INCOME
SECURITIES TRUST
JOHN HANCOCK INSTITUTIONAL
SERIES TRUST
JOHN HANCOCK INVESTMENT
TRUST
JOHN HANCOCK INVESTMENT
TRUST I1
JOHN HANCOCK INVESTORS
TRUST
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JOHN HANCOCK PATRIOT GLOBAL
DIVIDEND
JOHN HANCOCK PATRIOT
PREFERRED DIVIDEND FUND
JOHN HANCOCK PATRIOT
PREMIUM DIVIDEND FUND I
JOHN HANCOCK PATRIOT
PREMIUM DIVIDEND FUND II
JOHN HANCOCK PATRIOT SELECT
DIVIDEND TRUST
JOHN HANCOCK PREFERRED
INCOME FUND
JOHN HANCOCK PREFERRED
INCOME FUND II
JOHN HANCOCK SERIES TRUST
JOHN HANCOCK SOVEREIGN
BOND FUND
JOHN HANCOCK STRATEGIC
SERIES
JOHN HANCOCK TAX ADVNTGD
DIVIDEND INC.
JOHN HANCOCK TAX EXEMPT
SERIES FUNDS
JOHN HANCOCK TAX FREE BOND
TRUST
JOHN HANCOCK WORLD FUND
JOHNSON CONTROLS
JNL INVESTORS SERIES TRUST
JNL NY VARIABLE FUND I
JNL SERIES TRUST
JNL VARIABLE FUND
JNL VARIABLE FUND III
JNL VARIABLE FUND V
JPMORGAN INVESTMENT TRUST
KELLY SERVICES
KEYCORP OHIO
KIT COLE INVESTMENT TRUST
KMG CHEMICALS
KOSAN BIOSCIENCES
KVH INDUSTRIES
LABRANCHE & CO.
LAMSON & SESSIONS CO.
LANDAMERICA FINANCIAL
GROUP
LEBENTHAL FUNDS
LEGACY FUNDS GROUP
LIBERTY SELF STORAGE
LINEAR TECHNOLOGY CORP.
LITHIA MOTORS INC.
LKCM FUNDS
LSB BANCSHARES
MACQUARIE FST TR GBL INFRSTR
UT DIV&INCM FUND
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MACQUARIE INFRASTRUCTURE
ASSETS TRUST
MACQUARIE INFRASTRUCTURE
ASSETS LLC
MACQUARIE INFRASTRUCTURE
CO LLC
MACQUARIE INFRASTRUCTURE
CO TRUST
MANNATECH
MANPOWER INC.
MARVEL ENTERTAINMENT
MERCURY INTERACTIVE CORP.
MERIDIAN FUND INC. CA
MERIT ADVISORS INVESTMENT
TRUST
MERRIMAN INVESTMENT TRUST
METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER INC
METRON TECHNOLOGIES
MEXICO EQUITY AND INCOME
FUND
MIDLAND CO.
MIND CTI LTD.
MINN MUNICIPAL INCOME
PORTFOLIO
MIPS TECHNOLOGIES INC.
MOBIUS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
MOLECULAR DEVICES
MONARCH FUNDS
MONROE BANCORP
MORGAN KEEGAN SELECT FUND
MRO SOFTWARE
MRV COMMUNICATIONS
MURPHY MORRIS INVESTMENT
TRUST
NATIONAL BANK OF
INDIANAPOLIS CORP.
NATIONAL OILWELL VARCO
NATURAL HEALTH TRENDS CORP.
NCO GROUP
NEIGHBORCARE INC.
NELNET INC.
NEOPHARM INC.
NEPHROS INC.
NEW COVENANT FUNDS
NETLOGIC MICROSYSTEMS INC.
NEW HORIZONS WORLDWIDE
NEWPARK RESOURCES INC.
NEW PROVIDENCE INVESTMENT
TRUST
NORTH COUNTRY FUNDS
NORTHERN FUNDS
NORTHERN INSTITUTIONAL
FUNDS
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NOTTINGHAM INVESTMENT
TRUST
NT ALPHA STRATEGIES FUND
NUVELO INC.
NVR INC.
OFI TREMONT CORE STRATEGIES
HEDGE FUND
OFI TREMONT MARKET NEUTRAL
HEDGE FUND
OMNICOM GROUP INC.
ONE GROUP
ONE GROUP INVESTMENT TRUST
ONE GROUP MUTUAL FUNDS
OPLINK COMMUNICATIONS
OPPENHEIMER CONVERTIBLE
SECURITIES
OPPENHEIMER INTL LARGE CAP
CORE TRUST
OPPENHEIMER INTERNATIONAL
VALUE TRUST
OPPENHEIMER LTD. TERM
CALIFORNIA MUN FUND
OPPENHEIMER MIDCAP FUND
OPPENHEIMER PORTFOLIO SERIES
OPPENHEIMER QUEST CAPITAL
VALUE FUND
OPPENHEIMER QUEST FOR VALUE
FUND
OPPENHEIMER QUEST
INTERNATIONAL FUND
OPPENHEIMER QUEST VALUE
FUND
OPPENHEIMER REAL ESTATE
FUND
OPPENHEIMER SELECT VALUE
FUND
OPPENHEIMER TOTAL RETURN
BOND FUND
OPPENHEIMER TREMONT MKT
NEUTRAL FD
OPPENHEIMER TREMONT
OPPORTUNITY FD L L C
ORCKIT COMMUNICATIONS
OXIS INTERNATIONAL
PACIFIC CAPITAL FUNDS
PACIFIC MERCANTILE BANCORP
PAC WEST TELECOMM
PENFORD CORP.
PENNSYLVANIA COMMERCE
BANCORP
PENWEST PHARMACEUTICALS CO
PEPSIAMERICAS
PERCEPTRON INC.
PETSMART INC.
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PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT CORP
PHOENIX HOME LIFE VAR
ACCUMULATION ACCOUNT
PIEDMONT INVESTMENT TRU
PLANTRONICS, INC.
PLYMOUTH RUBBER CO.
PMC SIERRA
PMFM INVESTMENT TRUST
POST PROPERTIES
POTOMAC FUND
POTOMAC INSURANCE TRUST
PRIMECAP ODYSSEY FUNDS
PROFIT FUNDS INVESTMENT
TRUST
PROFESSIONAL MANAGED
PORTFOLIOS
PROGRESS SOFTWARE CORP.
PROVIDENCE SERVICE CORP.
RASER TECHNOLOGIES INC.
RC2 CORP.
REDENVELOPE INC.
REPLIGEN CORP.
RESTORATION HARDWARE
RESTORATION OPPORTUNITIES
FUND
REYNOLDS AMERICAN
RF MICRO DEVICES
RIGEL INC.
RMK ADVANTAGE INCOME FUND
RMK HIGH INCOME FUND
RMK SELECT FUNDS
RMK STRATEGIC INCOME FUND
ROCHESTER FUND MUNICIPALS
ROCHESTER PORTFOLIO SERIES
RUDOLPH TECHNOLOGIES
RURAL CELLULAR CORP.
RURAL METRO CORP.
RYAN'S FAMILY STEAK HOUSES
INC.
RYERSON TULL INC.
SAGA COMMUNICATIONS
SARA LEE CORP.
SCANA CORP.
SCB COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
SCHOOL SPECIALTY INC.
SCHWARTZ INVESTMENT TRUST
SCITEX CORP.
SECURITY CAPITAL REAL ESTATE
MUTUAL FUNDS INC.
SEIX FUNDS INC.
SEMTECH CORP.
SENOMYX INC.
SOCKET COMMUNICATIONS
SONUS NETWORKS
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SPORTSLINE.COM INC.
SRS LABS
SSGA FUNDS
SSP SOLUTIONS INC.
STATE AUTO FINANCIAL
STEPAN CO.
STEVEN MADDEN LTD.
STRATTON FUNDS INC.
STRATTON GROWTH FUND INC.
STRATTON MONTHLY DIVIDEND
REIT
STRESSGEN BIOTECHNOLOGIES
SUNCOAST BANCORP
SUREWEST COMMUNICATIONS
SYNOPSYS INC.
TARPON COAST BANCORP
TELEDYNE TECHNOLOGIES INC.
TELIK INC.
TEMPLETON DRAGON FUND
TEMPLETON EMERGING MARKETS
FUND
TEMPLETON GLOBAL BALANCED
INCOME FUND
TEMPLETON GLOBAL INCOME
FUND
TEMPLETON RUSSIA & EAST
EUROPEAN FUND
TFS CAPITAL INVESTMENT TRUST
TIKCRO TECHNOLOGIES LTD.
TILSON INVESTMENT TRUST
TIME WARNER INC.
TIMKEN CO.
TOCQUEVILLE ALEXIS TRUST
TOCQUEVILLE TRUST
TOLL BROTHERS INC.
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TOLLGRADE COMMUNICATIONS
TRANSALTA CORP.
TRANSWITCH CORP.
TRANS WORLD ENTERTAINMENT
TURNAROUND INVESTMENT
TRUST
ULTRA PETROLEUM
UNITED COMMUNITY
BANKSHARES OF FL
UNITED THERAPEUTICS
VENTURE FINANCIAL GROUP
V F CORP.
VICTORY INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS
VICTORY PORTFOLIOS
VICTORY VARIABLE INSURANCE
FUNDS
VITROTECH CORP. N.V.
WEBSITE PROS INC.
WESTAR ENERGY INC.
WESTCORP
WFS FINANCIAL
WGNB CORP.
WILLIAMSBURG INVESTMENT
TRUST
WILLIAMS INDUSTRIES
WILLAMS SONOMA
WILSHIRE MUTUAL FUNDS
WILSHIRE TARGET FUNDS
WINTERGREEN FUND
XATA CORP.
XCYTE THERAPIES
XENOGEN CORP. DEF
YOCREAM INTERNATIONAL
ZION OIL & GAS

